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CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDE

HOUSING AND BUILDING
MATERIAL IN GERMANY
PROGRAM AND ADMINISTRATION



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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

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III

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This Guide has been approved by the Committee on Civil Affairs Studies.

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SUMMARY

1. The shortage in housing in the German Old Reich has been increasing steadily since World War I. In 1939 there was a shortage of 1.5 million dwellings in relation to households. In addition there were about 2 million overcrowded and unsanitary dwellings in Germany at the outbreak of World War II. According to a German estimate made in 1938, 4.2 million dwellings would have to be built between 1938 and 1948 to cover these shortages plus normal demand.

2. The normal consumption of construction materials for building dwelling units is only a small fraction of the total consumption of these materials, based on a study of the 1937 building program. With the cessation of war production, material which has been scarce during the war will be released for use in dwelling construction. After a short lag during which the building materials industry adjusts itself to the change in demand, there should be no scarcity of materials for a building program.

3. The present war has affected the housing position, on both the supply and demand side, as follows:

a. Supply.—New construction has been held to an absolute minimum, and has been confined mainly to hasty completion of dwellings already under construction, to the building of barracks and other standardized types of emergency dwellings.

Allied bombing has rendered approximately 1.5 million dwellings uninhabitable and has inflicted minor damage on another 4.8 million as of 1 February 1944.

b. Demand.—The German civilian population requiring housing has decreased considerably because of the drafting of more than 11 million men into the armed forces and the loss of approximately 1 million evacuees, colonizers, and officials and their families to German-occupied countries.

Population shifts through large-scale evacuations from bombed cities has aggravated housing conditions in certain areas.

The influx of foreign workers has been housed in barracks.

4. Military Government will have to cope with the problem of an increasing demand for housing because of the demobilization of the army, the return of evacuees and officials from German-occupied countries, and the internal migration of evacuees. The housing program is closely related to the problem of providing employment and rehabilitating industrial centers.

5. Recommendations for coping with the problem are:

a. To continue the methods used by the German authorities for providing shelter, i. e., requisitioning and rationing of rooms and apartments, organizing essential repair work, and building emergency dwellings.

b. To leave the construction of permanent dwellings to the indigenous German governmental agencies.

HOUSING AND BUILDING MATERIALS IN GERMANY

A. Program

I. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM

A. The Housing Position and Regional Distribution of Shortages at the Beginning of World War II

Germany has had a shortage of housing since World War I. Construction activity ceased during the war and did not recover during the inflation period. In 1924 the currency was stabilized and the government subsidized housing construction, resulting in an average yearly supply of over 250,000 new dwellings until the depression caused the government to withdraw its aid to housing in 1931. Construction dropped in 1932 almost to the levels of the inflation period. The Nazi party attempted to alleviate the housing situation by instituting the following program:

1. Utilizing potential housing space through conversion and remodeling of existing dwellings.
2. Building settlements of small houses on the outskirts of large cities.
3. Increasing the unit-output of the dwelling construction industry by lowering housing standards.

The result of these efforts was an average yearly addition of over 300,000 dwellings to the total supply of dwellings until the outbreak of war. Table 1 in Appendix A gives data on housing construction in the Old Reich since 1919.

In spite of the increased construction activity in the periods of 1927-30 and 1934-39, the supply of new dwellings each year since 1919 has been exceeded by the demand caused by the increase in the number of households. As a consequence there was in Germany at the beginning of World War II a shortage of over 1,500,000 dwelling units. In addition to this actual shortage of dwellings (in comparison with households) there existed an urgent need to replace dilapidated and overcrowded dwellings in slum areas. Germany has a very high percentage of old and substandard dwellings; of 19,300,000 units existing in Greater Germany in 1937, 13,500,000 were 25 to 100 years old.¹

Technik, Gau Berlin NSDAP, 1940, p. 39.

An article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 4 December 1942, estimated that at the outbreak of World War II, there were about two million unsanitary and overcrowded² dwellings in Germany. Overcrowding was most prevalent in the eastern districts (Köslin, Schneidemühl, Königsberg, Gumbinnen, Allenstein, Breslau, Oppeln, Troppau, Aussig, Karlsbad, Oberdonau, Niederdonau, Steiermark, Kärnten, and Vorarlberg), while the shortage of dwellings in relation to households was more acute in the western districts in 1933 but since then has spread throughout Germany. Doubling up of households was more common in large cities than in smaller communities.

¹ *Geordnete Wohnungswirtschaft*, by Dr. Ing. E. Frank, *Sachbearbeiter im Amt für Technik*, Gau Berlin NSDAP, 1940, p. 39.

² Overcrowded dwellings are those having an average of two or more persons per room.

In 1938 the "Institut für Konjunkturforschung" listed the expected housing shortages which would exist in Germany by 1948 as follows:³

Estimated Requirements:

	<i>In units</i>
For families without dwelling of their own-----	1,500,000
For new families to be added 1938-48-----	1,000,000
To relieve overcrowded dwellings-----	900,000
To replace dwellings which should be demolished-----	400,000
To replace normal destruction (40,000 p. a.)-----	400,000
Total housing shortage in Germany by 1948-----	4,200,000

The greatest need on the basis of the above estimates appeared to be in the western industrial regions (Münster, Arnsberg, Aachen, Minden, Koblenz, Aurich, Trier, Pfalz, Dusseldorf, Westpreussen, Köln), in the eastern border regions (Allenstein, Königsberg, Gumbinnen, Breslau, and Niederbayern); and in middle-sized towns.

B. Regional Distribution of Shelter Shortages Resulting from War Developments

Since the beginning of World War II, the pattern of housing requirements has changed. The yearly volume of new dwelling construction during the war has dropped to an average of about 100,000 per year,⁴ the majority of new units being of a temporary nature, hastily finished, poorly equipped, and confined mainly to centers of war production. In addition, the industrial areas have lost approximately 1,500,000⁵ dwelling units through bombing, of which about 60 percent were totally destroyed, and 40 percent rendered uninhabitable for the duration, while 4,800,000 units have suffered minor damage. Bomb damage up to the present has been heaviest in the western and northern areas of Germany, with special concentration in certain industrial regions such as the Ruhr valley, and large industrial cities. Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix A contain estimates of damage by regions and cities as of 1 February 1944. As the war progresses, other areas will undoubtedly be raided, dependent upon the shift in industries and the Russian campaign.

An estimated total of 5,100,000 persons has been bombed out in Germany as of 1 April 1944.⁶ However, bombing is not the only cause of population displacement. One of the measures adopted by the German authorities to solve the shelter crisis caused by bombing has been an attempt to evacuate from regions exposed to aerial warfare all persons who were not employed in essential industries or services. Under this plan an estimated 4,500,000 women, children, and old persons have been evacuated⁷ from the bombed areas generally to small towns and rural areas in various parts of the Reich and of the occupied countries. Originally specific reception centers were set up for each threatened city in distant *Gaue*, generally in the eastern and southeastern areas of Germany, in the Protectorate, and in other

³ Dr. Walter Fey, *Der Künftige Wohnungs- und Siedlungsbau*, Berlin, 1939, p. 12.

⁴ According to Ley, Housing Commissioner of the Reich, 450,000 units have been finished in the 4 years of World War II (*Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*, 31 Oct. 1943).

⁵ OSS estimate as of 1 April 1944; Housing Commissioner Ley estimated the loss by bombing at 2 million rooms as of 31 October 1943, a figure which was slightly lower than OSS estimates of the same date.

⁶ OSS estimate based on the average number of persons per dwelling in 1939. See R & A No. 1426.

⁷ OSS estimate based on the number of persons eligible for evacuation: children under 14 years of age, mothers with young children living with them, pregnant women, non-working women over 45 years old, and nonworking men over 65 years old.

German-occupied countries. However, overcrowding in the reception centers and dissatisfaction with the operation of this scheme necessitated a change to the present system of evacuation to rural areas surrounding the bombed city. For further details on the evacuation system see Appendix B.

Of the 4,500,000 evacuees, about 30 percent have lost their homes through bombing. The rest have left habitable homes, thus creating billeting space for an estimated 3,150,000 persons in the bombed areas. In addition to these evacuees, an undetermined number of workers have been moved with their factories. Thus it may be seen that bombing affects housing conditions in areas outside the bombed cities.

C. Measures Taken by the German Authorities to Solve the Shelter Problem

The German authorities have given a great deal of attention to the war housing problem and have endeavored to solve it by all means possible without resorting to the construction of new dwellings. Because of the difficulties of obtaining labor and materials, all new construction was stopped at the beginning of the war under the building-stop order of Todt, August 1939. Exemptions from the building-stop have been given in order to complete buildings in the process of construction and to build new dwellings according to a priority system based on their war importance. As the war progressed, new building has been more and more curtailed and additional dwelling space has been sought by the following means:

- a. Subdividing large apartments.
- b. Reconverting offices which were originally dwellings.
- c. Requisitioning vacated apartments.
- d. Assigning dwellings obtained by the above methods to families according to an established priority system.
- e. Evacuating nonessential population from bombed areas.
- f. Requisitioning excess rooms in critical areas (all rooms of a dwelling in excess of one room for each person in the household), and using these rooms for billeting bombed-out persons and evacuees.
- g. Housing factory workers in barracks or hutted camps near their place of employment.

In spite of these efforts, the increased bomb damage to housing necessitated a further effort by the Nazi party to obtain dwelling space. In the Emergency Shelter Program⁸ outlined by Reich Housing Commissar Ley on 14 September 1943, the following optimistic results were anticipated by the end of that year:

100,000 dwelling units through reconversion of office space.

100,000 dwelling units by completing structures stopped in the process of construction.

1,000,000 evacuation bungalows.

In addition to these, it was proposed to convert attics into dwellings. Most widely publicized, however, have been the evacuation bungalows, which consist of one large room, subdivided into a kitchen-living room and a bedroom. They are built by their owners with the help of neighbors, and although originally designed to be made of prefabricated parts, the emergency requires that only local materials be

⁸ *Rheinische-Westfälische Zeitung*, 31 Oct. 1943, p. 5, No. 515; "Das Deutsche Wohnungshilfswerk," by Dr. Ley, *Reichswohnungskommissar*.

used. Permits to build, however, are only issued to those persons who can prove that they have access to building materials, a restriction which seems to have limited the program—only 2,100 bungalows had been completed by the end of 1943 instead of the million promised by Ley. These dwellings are well below peacetime housing standards, having no plumbing facilities, electricity, or gas, and allowing an average of only 35 to 50 square feet of floor space per person. They are built in communities in rural areas and each bungalow has 2,000 square feet of garden space.

D. Shelter Problems To Be Faced by the Occupation Authorities

1. Changes in Dwellings.—The shortage of dwellings will become worse within the next twelve months. Unless there is a drastic change in Allied bombing policy (especially that of the RAF), the number of dwellings rendered uninhabitable by the end of the war will greatly exceed present estimates. Further damage to houses may result from land warfare. Most of the people thus dehousing will be sheltered by the methods described in the preceding pages, probably by means of more intensive room crowding and an extension of the program of emergency construction.

2. Changes in Population.—The mobilization of men into the armed forces and the exodus of evacuees, officials and their families, and colonizers into German-occupied territory has actually eased the over-all housing situation. The national average number of civilian persons per dwelling decreased steadily until January 1943; by January 1944 it had increased, but was still below the 1939 average (3.42 as compared with 3.69). However, because of the lack of repairs and the tendency toward smaller dwellings the average number of rooms per dwelling has also decreased. There is at present still a slight reserve of rooms which could be obtained by strict rationing and a further dispersal of the population without regard to family ties or work ties.

This trend will, however, be sharply reversed within the coming year and particularly during the period of military occupation. As the war progresses, the evacuees, officials, and colonizers, estimated on 1 January 1944 at approximately 1,000,000,⁹ will return to the Old Reich. The demobilization of the German army and the requirements of the Allied armies will place a further strain on housing. In addition to the actual increase in total persons needing shelter, the situation will be further complicated by the internal migration of people caused (a) by the natural desire of families to reunite and return to their home cities, (b) by the rehabilitation of industrial areas, such as the Ruhr Valley, which have been severely damaged by air attacks, and (c) by the closing down of war plants, resulting in unemployment.

A countermovement will be the attempt of foreign workers in Germany to return to their home countries. There are at present an estimated 5,500,000¹⁰ foreign workers and 1,900,000,¹⁰ prisoners of war within the boundaries of the Old Reich, housed mainly in barracks or hutted camps, which will become available for emergency shelters.

⁹ OSS estimate.

¹⁰ OSS estimate as of 1 January 1944.

E. Housing Shortages in Relation to the Pre-War Production Potential of Construction Industries and Self-Sufficiency in Basic Building Materials

The accumulated housing shortages in the Reich based on official German estimate for peacetime deficiencies (as expected up to 1948), and on OSS estimates for wartime destruction (as of 1 April 1944) amount to approximately 5,700,000 dwelling units. In addition another 4,800,000 units are estimated to have suffered minor damage through aerial warfare, and they need immediate repairs. Additional bombing and possible land warfare may render many more dwellings uninhabitable.

Germany is self-sufficient in the building materials needed for dwelling construction.¹¹ An analysis of the building program for the year 1937, the year of greatest dwelling construction since World War I, clearly indicates the capacities of the German building industry. (See Appendices A (5) and C.) In that year 62.4 percent of the total production of bricks and tiles was used for dwelling construction, but a much smaller percentage of other basic material was put to this use. Dwelling construction was allotted only 12 percent of the total lumber consumed in Germany, or 30 percent of the amount consumed in all construction, 10.6 percent of the total production of cement, only 4.2 percent of the total consumption of steel, or 12.6 percent of the amount of steel used in all construction.

Bricks and tiles.—Because of their weight, it is important that transportation of bricks and tiles be kept at a minimum. In 1937, the brick and tile industry was distributed throughout the country in fairly good proportion to the needs (see table 4, Appendix A). However, the post-war need-pattern will be different, especially if construction is confined to the rebuilding of bombed areas (see table 2, Appendix A). During the war the production of bricks and tiles in Germany has dropped to about 20 percent of its pre-war level—12,500,000,000 pieces in 1937—but it can be restored without great difficulty. In bombed areas, bricks can be salvaged for use in reconstruction.

Lumber.—In 1938, the domestic cutting of timber amounted to about 60,000,000 *Fest Meters*.¹² of which 28,000,000 were used in the building industry. During the war cutting was decreased to about 53,000,000 *Fest Meters* and competition between military and civilian requirements for barracks and huts caused a shortage which will be relieved after the war when military demands are eliminated.

Cement.—Before the war, Germany was second only to the United States in its production of cement, producing about 15 percent of the total world supply. The distribution of raw materials has resulted in a widespread distribution of the industry throughout the country.

Pre-war potential capacity of the industry was estimated at about 16,500,000 metric tons; production during the war has fallen to about 10,000,000 metric tons, of which about 80 percent was allocated to military uses. Thus there will be an ample supply for an emergency housing program after the war.

¹¹ The only raw material which might be in over-all short supply is lumber. However only a relatively small proportion of lumber goes to housing and it should be noted that the most vital need for lumber in the immediate post-war period will be in housing.

¹² A *Fest Meter* is a German term applied to a cubic meter of *Rohholz*, or wood from which the bark has not been cut. A *Fest Meter* (or cubic meter of this type of wood) yields .7 cubic meters of sawn timber, or approximately 296 board feet of sawn timber.

Steel.—Such a small proportion of steel production is used in dwelling construction, especially in temporary dwellings, that it needs no discussion, particularly when great quantities of steel will be available for civilian consumption at the end of the war.

Labor.—In 1937 there were 2,365,000 employed in the construction industry, of which 516,000 were engaged in dwelling construction. The total number of workers in the construction and construction material industry has declined only slightly during the war. OSS estimates as of 1 January 1944 place the total employed at 2,200,000. Most of this labor has been employed on military construction and repairs to war plants damaged by bombing. After the war there will be no over-all lack of labor for dwelling construction.

Flat glass.—Principal producing areas for sheet glass are Westphalia and Rhineland (including the Saar), Bavaria, Silesia, and Torgau on the Elbe (northeast of Leipzig).

The following table shows total production of flat glass in Germany and Austria in 1937:

Products	Area in million square feet	Percentage by area	Production in tons	Percentage by weight
Sheet glass, plain and fancy.....	325.1	90	143,000	78
Sheet glass, colored.....	7.6	2	3,000	2
Plate glass.....	28.5	8	37,000	20
Total.....	361.2	100	183,000	100

Germany was the fifth largest producer of sheet glass in the world. The proportion of window glass is about 95 percent of the total sheet glass output.

In 1929, the number of sheet glass works was reported to be about 5,000, and this number had increased by 1938.

Nearly half of Germany's sheet glass production comes from one firm, Deutsche Tafelglas A. G., with three main factories at Weiden, Bavaria; Witten-Krengeldanz; and Kunzendorf, Silesia.

Since 1931, Germany's exports of sheet glass have exceeded her imports. Window glass exports and imports, as compared with total sheet glass foreign trade, in specified years are as follows:

	1929	1931	1933	1935
Imports:	<i>Pounds</i>	<i>Pounds</i>	<i>Pounds</i>	<i>Pounds</i>
Ordinary window glass.....	67,129,000	29,949,000	18,556,000	18,426,000
Total sheet glass.....	67,554,000	30,242,000	18,664,000	18,542,000
Exports:				
Ordinary window glass.....	8,302,000	54,713,000	36,095,000	62,230,000
Total sheet glass.....	11,891,000	57,722,000	38,341,000	65,473,000

Manufacture of flat glass in Germany is estimated to consume approximately 200,000 tons of sand per annum, 40,000 tons of soda, 60,000 tons of lime, and 250,000 tons of fuel.

According to the German press (June 1943), the reduction in construction activity during the first months of the war caused window pane production to drop. It soon rose again, owing to the demand for replacement of window panes smashed by air raids. Mechanical production and the addition of the Sudetan plants enabled a gradual increase in the output.

Despite this increase, it was not possible to replace all windows broken as a result of air raids. In the period of Military Government there will not be enough glass to meet demands. Rationing and use of substitutes will be necessary.

It is reported that a new window-glass substitute ("*Rollglas*") for repairs has been evolved, consisting of a transparent, waterproof plastic. It can be rolled and cut like paper, and nailed to window frames. Unlike glass, it is flexible, and transmits ultra-violet rays, but will not stand high temperatures. Mosquito netting covered with acetate has also been found to be a good emergency substitute for window glass.

Since August 1943 deliveries of sheet glass have taken place only on receipt of a glass coupon (*Glasmarke*).

Regulations effective 1 July 1943 give high priority for allocation of window glass to air-raid victims and armament industries.

Roofing felt and paper.—Raw materials for the manufacture of roofing felt and paper are available in sufficient quantities in Germany. The normal output of plants scattered throughout the country exceeded the domestic demand, and considerable quantities of roofing material have been exported in pre-war years.

Requirements for an emergency building program.—Estimates¹³ of the amount of materials needed for each emergency shelter of the Ley type, described previously, indicate that 1 million such units could be constructed within the period of a year with the consumption of a slightly larger amount of basic materials than in the construction of 310,000 dwellings in 1937; 8 billion pieces of bricks and tiles, 5 million CBM of lumber, 2,000,000 metric tons of cement and 35,000 metric tons of steel. Such a program would require 1,500,000,000 man-hours of labor, according to FEA estimates. Man-hour estimates of MEW are lower—1,050 per dwelling of which 700 go to fabrication and transport and 350 to site clearance and erections. The difference may be explained by the fact that FEA estimates are figured for unskilled labor and conventional methods of erection, whereas MEW bases its estimates on the original German plan for the use of prefabricated parts.

Assuming that the production of construction materials in the post-war period returned to the 1937 level, and that a similar proportion was allocated to dwelling construction, a program of 1 million emergency dwellings is too ambitious, since as much as 50 percent of the materials allocated to dwelling construction may be needed for the repair of damaged houses. However, the proportion of materials allocated to dwelling construction may be greater than in 1937 because little or none will be needed for the construction of public buildings and military fortifications.

Progress may be made by the Germans during 1944 in the field of prefabrication, which will prove helpful to the Military Government shelter program. Originally the Ley emergency shelter program was based on the idea of mass production of prefabricated parts which could easily be assembled by unskilled labor with the aid of printed instructions. Up to the present, however, prefabricated parts have not been available and prospective builders have been urged to find their own building materials, through salvage methods if possible.

¹³ By FEA—see table 5, Appendix A.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Introduction

Housing is an immediate Military Government problem only insofar as inadequate housing endangers military security. However, since adequate housing is an important factor in creating conditions favorable to a desirable development of the German public, Military Government may decide to take a wider view of the housing problem. With this possibility in mind, reasonable indigenous efforts designed to get a permanent building program under way should not be discouraged by Military Government.

In order to cope with the housing problem, a shelter program should be developed in three phases, the first two of which should be the concern of Military Government: (1) the immediate program that will be required to provide emergency shelter to the homeless. This program should be carried out on a local level and should be in effect for the first month or two in areas of critical housing shortage. This program is mainly an administrative one and can be effectuated through decrees issued by Military Government and carried out by existing local government agencies, as suggested in the section of this report on administration; (2) the temporary construction program which should be put into effect in areas where the influx of population strains the shelter facilities beyond the capacity of the immediate program and entails the rapid construction of new dwellings; (3) the long-term construction program, which entails the reconstruction of damaged cities by building permanent structures according to modern standards. This is not a Military Government function.

The following recommendations are subdivided according to the three phases.

B. The Immediate Program

It is assumed that Military Government officers will follow the German scheme for providing shelter by exhausting available facilities before resorting to new construction. To this end, schools, public buildings, warehouses, hotels, barracks, closed-down factories, or office buildings should be requisitioned for the immediate sheltering of homeless persons. Since the occupying armies will be requisitioning the same type of structure for their needs, close cooperation will be necessary. Such accommodations could be used as temporary shelters while space was being located in more permanent dwelling structures.

In determining the amount of space available in existing homes, use could be made of the files kept in the office of the mayor or the *Landrat*. The following registers may prove useful:

a. Register of persons—an alphabetical card index of all persons registered within the jurisdiction of the registration office (citizens and noncitizens).

b. Register of buildings—an index by address of all buildings, containing the names and addresses of the owner and the superintendent, and the names and occupations of all tenants.

The above registers are found in the 125 local offices of the national police¹⁴ which are established in large cities, capitals of states, and

¹⁴ See CA Guide on *Police and Public Safety in Germany*.

important industrial cities, and in the office of the mayor or *Landrat* in smaller communities. These registers are under the jurisdiction of the Reich Minister of Interior. Duplicates of the local registers are kept in the Reich Statistical Office in Berlin. The registers are normally kept up to date through the requirement that everyone must register whenever he moves in or out of a dwelling and in or out of a town.

c. Register of under-occupied flats, which is kept in the housing office in each community.

After determining the amount of space in existing dwellings, this space could be rationed through the enforcement of existing legislation according to the present German emergency standards of not more than one room per person, or according to a standard set up by the occupation authorities. A suggested minimum standard might be 30 square feet of floor space per capita, as a subsistence level for a short period of time. The standards should be applied to towns and cities surrounding the city of critical housing shortage within a radius determined by the available transportation.

Additional space could be obtained by organizing a program of clearance and repair of bomb damage. Such work will probably have been started by the community before Military Government arrives, and should be encouraged.

C. The Temporary Construction Program

Depending on the development of industries in Germany there will be a demand for the rapid construction of dwellings in certain of the bombed areas. Local needs could be estimated on the basis of the number of persons to be housed in addition to those which could be sheltered by means of the immediate program. Consideration must also be taken of the fact that the minimum standard of 30 square feet of floor space per capita suggested for the immediate program is a temporary one, and must be relieved if not by a population shift, then by the provision of more adequate shelter. This need could be met by extending the program of evacuation bungalows initiated by Ley and described earlier in this report, and by erecting barracks for single workers.

Use should be made of local materials, even materials salvaged in the clearance of bomb damage. Production of prefabricated houses, which may develop on a large scale during 1944, according to German plans, should be expanded. Firms which have been manufacturing wooden barracks for the army could be converted to the production of dwelling houses.

D. The Long-Term Program

The building of more permanent types of dwellings may be undertaken by German building organizations during the period of Military Government. The only concern of Military Government officials in regard to this program will be to see that speculative building concerns are not allowed to disregard existing local zoning laws or plans for reconstruction of the city which have been made in the local housing office.

APPENDIX A

TABLE 1.—Housing construction in the Reich, 1919-43 ^{1 2}

Year	Total	Dwellings added—		Dwellings demolished	Net increase
		Through new construction	Through conversion		
1919.....	60,861	35,596	25,265	4,147	56,714
1920.....	108,307	75,925	32,379	5,215	103,092
1921.....	141,438	108,596	32,902	7,275	134,223
1922.....	154,970	124,273	30,697	8,355	146,615
1923.....	125,940	100,401	23,539	7,607	118,333
1924.....	115,376	94,807	20,569	8,874	106,502
1925.....	191,812	164,437	27,375	12,882	178,930
1926.....	220,529	199,084	21,445	14,736	205,793
1927.....	306,834	284,444	22,390	18,199	288,635
1928.....	330,442	306,825	23,617	20,680	309,762
1929.....	338,802	315,703	23,099	21,120	317,682
1930.....	330,260	307,933	22,327	19,289	310,971
1931.....	251,701	231,342	20,359	18,053	233,648
1932.....	159,121	131,160	27,961	17,856	141,265
1933.....	202,113	132,870	69,243	24,075	178,038
1934.....	319,430	190,257	129,182	35,444	283,995
1935.....	263,810	213,227	50,583	22,778	241,032
1936.....	332,370	282,466	49,904	21,890	310,490
1937.....	340,392	308,945	31,447	20,335	320,057
1938.....	305,526	276,276	29,250	20,257	285,269
1939.....	250,000	220,000	30,000	20,000	230,000
1940.....	145,000	³ 115,000	30,000	20,000	125,000
1941.....	160,000	³ 125,000	35,000	30,000	130,000
1942.....	160,000	³ 60,000	100,000	⁴ 100,000	60,000
1943.....	254,000	³ 160,000	154,000	⁴ 900,000	-646,000

¹ Including Saarland since 1935.

² Figures for 1939-43 are estimates based on intelligence material.

³ Mostly temporary dwellings.

⁴ Bomb damage 1942-43.

Sources: *Leistungen und Aufgaben in Deutschen Wohnungs- und Siedlungsbau*, Walter Fey, Berlin, 1936, p. 13. *Vierteljahrshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, 1938 and 1939, Heft II.

TABLE 2.—Regional distribution of shelter shortages caused by war destruction, compared with productive capacities of the construction industry and the output of bricks in Germany

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	(1941) Area (sq. kilo- meters)	(1939) Popula- tion	(1939) Number of households	(1939) Number of dwelling units	Dwelling units rendered uninhabitable (1 Apr. 1944) ¹	Percent of (5)	Persons rendered homeless (1 Apr. 1944) ¹	Percent of (3)	Dwellings uninhabit- able by bombing (1-4-4) ²	Capacity of the construc- tion industry (1937) ²	Output of bricks (1937) ³
States and provinces					Number		Number				
Preussen	294,693.40	41,574,988	12,234,000	10,947,000	943,780	8.6	3,094,524	7.4	66.0	61	64
Ostpreussen	36,485.60	2,341,008	635,000	593,000						3	4
Stadt Berlin	833.66	4,338,756	1,605,000	1,463,000	395,700	27.0	1,187,100	27.4	27.7	7	1
Brandenburg	38,278.46	3,007,933	904,000	818,000						5	9
Pommern ⁴	38,404.00	2,393,844	651,000	608,000	14,400	2.4	48,960	2.0	1.0	4	4
Sachsen ⁵	37,034.52	4,838,764	1,422,000	1,324,000						7	13
Sachsen	25,531.57	3,618,458	1,100,000	996,000	500	1	1,550	1	1	5	6
Schleswig-Holstein ⁶	15,637.47	1,589,257	453,000	408,000	5,200	1.3	18,300	1.2	4	2	2
Hannover	38,642.04	3,476,056	949,000	858,000	70,680	8.2	234,464	6.7	4.9	5	6
Westfalen	20,216.51	5,209,401	1,419,000	1,190,000	53,100	4.5	199,710	3.8	3.7	7	6
Hessen-Nassau	16,845.85	2,675,111	779,000	685,000	101,200	14.8	336,800	12.6	7.1	5	3
Rheinprovinz	25,535.46	7,982,684	2,337,000	1,984,000	303,000	15.3	1,067,640	13.4	21.2	11	10
Hohenzollern	1,142.26	73,705	20,000	20,000							
Bayern	77,785.03	8,222,982	2,195,000	1,974,000	49,100	2.5	170,670	2.1	3.4	11	11
Sachsen	14,994.90	5,231,739	1,702,000	1,604,000	62,200	3.9	217,700	4.2	4.4	8	7
Württemberg	19,507.10	2,856,920	795,000	765,000	14,250	1.9	50,050	1.7	1.0	4	4
Baden	15,063.37	2,502,442	691,000	645,000	45,500	7.1	154,700	6.2	3.2	4	3
Thüringen	11,760.35	1,743,624	519,000	472,000						3	2
Hessen	7,690.62	1,469,215	431,000	380,000	3,100	.8	11,160	.8	.2	2	1
Hamburg	746.62	1,711,877	582,000	529,000	298,000	56.3	953,600	55.7	20.8	2	
Mecklenburg	15,721.66	900,417	256,000	231,000	6,500	2.8	23,400	2.6	.5	1	1
Oldenburg	5,396.47	577,648	145,000	128,000	1,000	.8	4,000	.7	.1	1	1
Braunschweig	3,672.05	583,338	174,000	154,000	3,800	2.5	13,300	2.3	.3	1	1
Bremen	324.16	450,084	127,000	113,000	2,600	2.3	11,180	2.5	.2	1	1
Anhalt	2,315.53	431,422	131,000	116,000						1	1
Lippe	1,215.18	187,220	52,000	47,000						4	
Schaumburg-Lippe	340.32	53,195	16,000	15,000							
Reich	471,232.76	68,537,111	20,160,000	18,120,000	1,429,830	7.9	4,704,284	6.9	100.0	100	100

¹ OSS estimates.² The regional capacity of the construction industry is based on the number of workers employed in that industry in various regions in 1937. These capacities will actually be slightly different because of regional variations, in organizational methods, and constructional techniques applied.³ Bricks represent the largest load in transportation for new construction of dwellings: Approximately 90 metric tons per dwelling unit. The quantity of cement used in 1937 per dwelling unit (in workers' dwellings) was on the average, 4 metric tons; lumber 7.25 metric tons; and iron, steel, and their products only 1.25 metric tons.⁴ Grenzmark is included in Pommern.⁵ Includes Niederschlesien and Oberschlesien.⁶ Luebeck is included in Schleswig-Holstein.Source for data on the construction industry and brick production: *Der Kuenftige Wohnungs- und Siedlungsbau*, Walter Fcy, Berlin, 1939, pp. 53-54.

**TABLE 3.—Bomb damage by State, Province, administrative area, and city, as of
1 Apr. 1944**

	Total dwellings 1939	Rendered uninhab- itable	Percent	Persons rendered homeless
Preussen.....	10,947,000	943,780	8.6	3,091,524
Berlin.....	1,463,000	395,700	27.0	1,187,100
Pommern.....	608,000	14,400	2.4	48,960
R. Stettin: Stettin.....	81,100	14,490	17.8	48,960
Total.....	81,100	14,400	17.8	48,960
Schleswig-Holstein.....	405,000	5,200	1.3	18,200
R. Schleswig:				
Flensburg.....	20,000	neg.		
Kiel.....	71,800	1,000	1.4	3,600
Lübeck.....	42,400	4,200	9.9	14,700
Neumünster.....	15,700			
Total.....	149,900	5,200	3.5	18,300
Hannover.....	853,000	70,680	8.2	234,464
R. Hannover:				
Cuxhaven.....	10,000	80	.8	264
Hannover.....	145,200	67,600	46.6	223,080
Total.....	155,200	67,680	43.6	223,344
R. Osnabrueck: Osnabrueck.....	28,800	1,400	4.9	5,040
Total.....	28,800	1,400	4.9	5,040
R. Aurich: Emden.....	9,100	1,600	17.6	6,080
Total.....	9,100	1,600	17.6	6,080
Westfalen.....	1,190,000	53,100	4.5	199,710
R. Münster:				
Bottrop.....	18,800	300	1.6	1,320
Gelsenkirchen.....	80,000	400	.5	1,600
Gladbeck.....	14,300			
Münster.....	30,700	1,200	3.9	5,160
Recklinghausen.....	20,700			
Total.....	164,500	1,900	1.2	8,080
R. Arnsberg:				
Bochum.....	81,800	15,700	19.2	58,090
Castrop-Rauxel.....	13,300			
Dortmund.....	143,200	28,700	20.0	109,060
Hagen.....	41,900	6,800	16.2	24,480
Hamm.....	14,700	neg.		
Herne.....	24,400			
Wanne-Eickel.....	22,100			
Wattenscheid.....	16,200			
Witten.....	20,600			
Total.....	378,200	51,200	13.5	191,630
Hessen-Nassau.....	685,000	101,200	14.8	336,800
R. Kassel: Kassel.....	59,600	32,400	54.4	116,640
Total.....	59,600	32,400	54.4	116,640
R. Wiesbaden:				
Frankfurt aM.....	170,200	68,800	40.4	220,160
Wiesbaden.....	49,200			
Total.....	219,400	68,800	31.4	220,160
Rheinprovinz.....	1,934,000	303,000	15.3	1,067,640
R. Düsseldorf:				
Düsseldorf.....	148,400	53,700	36.2	193,320
Duisburg.....	110,200	9,900	9.0	38,610
Essen.....	173,400	40,100	23.1	152,380
Krefeld.....	51,600	15,500	30.0	51,150
Leverkusen.....	13,400			
Moers.....	8,000	600	7.5	2,220
Mülheim.....	37,300	8,700	23.3	32,190
München Gladbach.....	32,400	16,600	51.2	66,400
Neuss.....	14,900			
Oberhausen.....	46,300	7,000	15.1	28,700
Remscheid.....	31,200	15,700	50.3	51,810
Rheydt.....	21,000			
Solingen.....	44,400			
Wuppertal (total).....	123,400	44,100	35.7	141,120
Barmen.....		22,600		
Elberfeld.....		21,500		
Total.....	855,900	211,900	24.8	757,900
R. Köln:				
Bonn.....	27,000			
Köln.....	225,600	71,110	31.5	241,740
Total.....	252,600	71,110	28.1	241,740

TABLE 3.—*Bomb damage by State, Province, administrative area, and city, as of 1 Apr. 1944—Continued*

	Total dwellings 1939	Rendered uninhabitable	Percent	Persons rendered homeless
Rheinprovinz—Continued.				
R. Aachen: Aachen.....	47,300	20,000	42.3	68,000
Total.....	47,300	20,000	42.3	68,000
Sachsen.....	996,000	500	.1	1,550
R. Magdeburg:				
Halberstadt.....	15,700			
Magdeburg.....	105,000	500	.5	1,550
Total.....	120,700	500	.4	1,550
Bayern.....	1,974,000	49,100	2.5	170,670
R. Oberbayern: München.....	241,000	11,800	4.9	40,120
Total.....	241,000	11,800	4.9	40,120
R. Ober-und Mittelfranken:				
Bamberg.....	15,400			
Fürth.....	23,100			
Nürnberg.....	119,700	15,000	12.5	52,500
Total.....	158,200	15,000	9.5	52,500
R. Mainfranken:				
Schweinfurt.....	14,100	2,400	17.0	8,400
Würzburg.....	27,500			
Total.....	41,600	2,400	5.8	8,400
R. Schwaben: Augsburg.....	51,000	19,900	39.0	69,650
Total.....	51,000	19,900	39.0	69,650
Sachsen.....	1,604,000	62,200	3.9	217,700
R. Leipzig: Leipzig.....	224,200	62,200	27.7	217,700
Total.....	224,200	62,200	27.7	217,700
Württemberg.....	765,000	14,250	1.9	50,050
Heilbronn.....	21,800			
Stuttgart.....	124,900	14,000	10.9	49,000
Ulm.....	19,700			
Friedrichshafen.....	5,300	250	4.7	1,050
Total.....	175,700	14,250	8.1	50,050
Baden.....	645,000	45,500	(1)	154,700
Freiburg.....	27,800			
Karlsruhe.....	54,700	7,000	12.8	23,800
Pforzheim.....	23,800			
Heidelberg.....	23,400			
Mannheim.....	81,600	38,500	(1)	130,800
Total.....	211,300	45,500	(1)	154,700
Hansestadt Hamburg.....	528,500	298,000	56.4	953,600
Hessen.....	330,000	3,100	.8	11,160
Darmstadt.....	32,200	neg.		
Mainz.....	42,900	3,100	7.2	11,160
Offenbach.....	26,700			
Worms.....	14,600			
Total.....	116,400	3,100	2.7	11,160
Mecklenburg.....	231,600	6,500	2.8	23,400
Rostock.....	32,400	6,500	20.1	23,400
Schwerin.....	19,800			
Wismar.....	10,000			
Total.....	62,200	6,500	10.5	23,400
Oldenburg.....	128,000	1,000	.8	4,000
Oldenburg.....	19,700	neg.		
Wilhelmshaven.....	26,200	1,000	3.8	4,000
Total.....	45,900	1,000	2.2	4,000

See footnote at end of table.

TABLE 3.—*Bomb damage by State, Province, administrative area, and city, as of 1 Apr. 1944—Continued*

	Total dwellings 1939	Rendered uninhabitable	Percent	Persons rendered homeless
Bremen.....	113,000	2,600	2.3	11,180
Bremen.....	98,400	2,600	2.6	11,180
Total.....	98,400	2,600	2.6	11,180
Saarland: Saarbrücken.....	36,240	5,090	13.8	18,000
Total.....	36,240	5,000	13.8	18,000
Braunschweig.....	154,000	3,800	2.5	13,300
Braunschweig.....	58,000	3,800	6.6	13,300
Total.....	58,000	3,800	6.6	13,300
Total damage.....		1,434,830		4,722,284

¹ Figure includes damage to Ludwigshafen; therefore percentage is omitted.

TABLE 4.—*Regional distribution of estimated housing shortage (1948) and productive capacities of the construction industry and the output of bricks in Germany (1937)*

(1) Provinces and states	(2) (1933) Area square kilometers	(3) (1933) Population official census	(4) (16-6-1933) Number of households	(5) (June 1933) Number of dwelling units	(6) Shortage or surplus (1933) of dwelling units	
					Number	Percent of 5
Ostpreussen.....	36,991.75	2,333,301	556,768	541,200	-15,568	2.9
Stadt Berlin.....	883.63	4,242,501	1,449,973	1,362,900	-87,073	6.4
Brandenburg.....	38,274.99	2,612,080	785,249	745,900	-39,349	5.3
Pommern ^d	38,400.86	2,268,084	578,688	557,900	-20,788	3.7
Schlesien ^e	36,696.38	4,710,372	1,273,756	1,216,700	-57,056	4.7
Sachsen.....	25,528.56	3,400,648	971,983	910,200	-61,783	6.8
Schleswig-Holstein ^f	15,681.97	1,420,265	490,183	452,200	-37,983	8.4
Hannover.....	38,704.79	3,236,868	857,906	813,300	-44,606	5.5
Westfalen.....	20,214.84	5,039,963	1,234,240	1,090,500	-143,740	13.2
Hessen-Nassau.....	16,845.22	2,584,823	670,788	632,500	-38,288	6.1
Rheinprovinz.....	24,476.92	7,690,266	2,044,673	1,820,800	-223,873	12.3
Hohenzollern.....	1,142.26	72,991	17,636	19,000	+1,314	* 6.9
TOTAL						
Preussen.....	293,842.17	39,692,167	10,931,893	10,163,100	-768,746	6.6
Bayern.....	76,089.20	7,682,447	1,881,800	1,785,700	-96,100	3.4
Sachsen.....	14,994.70	5,196,652	1,582,107	1,468,400	-113,707	7.7
Württemberg.....	19,507.73	2,696,324	690,265	681,300	-8,965	1.3
Baden.....	15,069.65	2,412,951	609,932	595,900	-14,032	2.4
Thüringen.....	11,762.73	1,659,510	458,857	432,400	-26,457	6.1
Hessen.....	7,691.40	1,429,048	375,353	352,100	-23,253	6.6
Hamburg.....	746.04	1,675,703	383,451	360,700	-22,751	6.3
Mecklenburg.....	15,720.88	804,948	217,004	206,400	-10,604	5.1
Oldenburg.....	5,396.27	495,119	138,591	130,400	-8,191	6.3
Braunschweig.....	3,672.00	512,989	149,601	139,000	-10,601	7.6
Bremen.....	257.81	371,558	108,286	101,400	-6,886	6.8
Anhalt.....	2,314.32	364,415	109,164	100,400	-8,764	8.7
Lippe.....	1,215.17	175,538	44,687	42,400	-2,287	5.4
Schaumburg-Lippe.....	340.29	49,955	13,927	14,000	+73	* 5
Reich.....	468,620.36	65,219,324	17,694,918	16,573,600	-121,271	6.8

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE 4.—Regional distribution of estimated housing shortage (1948) and productive capacities of the construction industry and the output of bricks in Germany (1937)—Continued.

(1) Provinces and states	(7) (1933-48) Units needed for new families ^a		(8) (1933) Units needed to relieve over- crowding ^a		(9) Estimated total shortage (1948) ^a		(10)	(11)	(12)
							Distribution in percent of Reich total		
	Number	Percent of 5	Number	Percent of 5	Number	Percent of 5	Regional housing shortage (by 1948)	Capacity of the construc- tion industry (1937) ^b	Output of bricks (1937) ^c
Ostpreussen.....	111,000	20.5	77,800	14.4	204,400	37.8	5	3	4
Stadt Berlin.....	17,400	*1.3	60,900	4.5	130,500	9.6	3	7	1
Brandenburg.....	56,600	7.6	38,700	5.2	134,600	18.0	3	5	9
Pommern ^d	82,600	14.7	43,100	7.7	145,900	26.2	4	4	4
Schlesien ^e	207,700	17.1	195,800	16.1	460,500	37.8	10	7	13
Sachsen.....	109,700	12.1	26,800	2.9	198,300	21.8	5	5	6
Schleswig-Hol- stein ^f	47,400	10.5	9,100	2.0	94,400	20.8	2	2	2
Hannover.....	117,600	14.5	20,000	2.5	182,200	22.4	4	5	6
Westfalen.....	277,300	25.4	81,100	7.4	502,160	46.0	12	7	6
Hessen-Nassau.....	79,900	12.6	12,800	2.0	131,000	20.7	3	5	3
Rheinprovinz.....	318,700	17.5	94,800	5.2	637,400	35.0	15	11	10
Hohenzollern.....	2,400	12.6	100	.5	1,200	6.3	-----	-----	-----
TOTAL									
Preussen.....	1,392,900	13.7	661,000	6.5	2,822,500	27.8	66	61	64
Bayern.....	308,500	17.3	97,400	5.5	502,000	28.1	12	11	11
Sachsen.....	134,000	9.1	52,800	3.6	300,500	20.5	7	8	7
Württemberg.....	104,700	15.4	7,400	1.1	121,100	17.8	3	4	4
Baden.....	92,100	15.5	16,800	2.8	122,900	20.6	3	4	3
Thuringen.....	55,500	12.8	10,800	2.5	92,800	21.5	2	3	2
Hessen.....	46,800	13.3	9,000	2.6	79,100	22.5	2	2	1
Hamburg.....	8,500	2.4	4,700	1.3	36,000	10.0	1	2	1
Mecklenburg.....	22,100	10.7	3,500	1.7	36,200	17.5	1	1	1
Oldenburg.....	27,400	21.0	3,900	3.0	39,500	30.3	1	1	1
Braunschweig.....	12,000	8.6	1,500	1.1	24,100	17.3	1	1	-----
Bremen.....	8,500	8.4	1,200	1.2	16,600	16.4	-----	1	-----
Anhalt.....	9,900	9.9	3,300	3.3	21,900	21.8	1	1	1
Lippe.....	6,900	16.3	800	1.9	10,000	23.6	-----	-----	4
Schaumburg- Lippe.....	1,400	10.0	100	.7	1,400	10.0	-----	-----	-----
Reich.....	2,231,200	13.5	874,200	5.3	4,226,600	25.5	100	100	100

^a According to official German estimates.

^b The regional capacity of the construction industry is based on the numbers of workers employed in that industry in various regions (in 1937).

^c Bricks represent the largest load on transportation for new construction of dwellings: approximately 90 metric tons per dwelling unit. The quantity of cement used in 1937 per dwelling unit was on the average 4 metric tons, lumber 7¼ metric tons, and iron, steel, and their products in workers' dwellings only 1¼ metric tons.

^d Grenzmark is included in Pommern.

^e Includes Niederschlesien and Oberschlesien.

^f Lubeck is included in Schleswig-Holstein.

Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 1938, p. 7; *Der Künftige Wohnungs- und Siedlungsbau*, by Walter Fey, Berlin, 1939, pp. 15, 26, 36, 53, 54.

TABLE 5.—Requirements of basic building materials, labor, and funds for construction of dwellings

Requirements	Brick (pieces)	Lumber (c. b. m.) ^a	Cement (m. t.)	Steel (m. t.)	Labor force		Funds (RM.)
					Number employed	Man-hours ^b	
I. Pre-war Total Requirements (1937)							
1937 total Reich consumption for all uses	12.5 bil. ^d	33.6 mil	11.75 mil	17.0 mil	13,235 mil. ^e	(^c)	(^c).
1937 use in all construction industries	(^c)	13.3 mil	(^c)	5.7 mil	2,365 mil.	4.22 bil.	(^c).
II. Pre-war Housing Requirements							
1937 use in construction of 310,000 dwelling units.	7.8 bil	4.0 mil	1.25 mil	720,000 ^k	516-000,	929 mil.	2.0 bil.
1937 use per dwelling units	25,000 ^f	13 ^g	4 ^h	2.3 ⁱ	(^c)	2,983	6,500 ^j .
1937 use for dwelling construction in per- cent of use in all construction industries.	(^c)	30%	(^c)	12.6%	21.8%	21.8%	(^c).
1937 use for dwelling construction in per- cent of total use in German Reich.	62.4%	12.0%	10.6%	4.2%	3.9%	(^c)	(^c).
III. Emergency Shelter Program							
Required for 1 dwelling unit ^l	8,000 ^m	5 ⁿ	2 ⁿ	035 ^e	(^c)	1,500	2,825.
Required for 100,000 dwelling units	800 mil	500,000	200,000	3,500	(^c)	150 mil.	282.5 mil
IV. Long-term Housing Program							
Required for 1 dwelling unit ^p	25,000	15	5	2.5	(^c)	2,400	6,000.
Required for 100,000 dwelling units	2.5 bil.	1.5 mil	500,000	250,000	(^c)	240 mil.	600 mil.

(See footnotes on page 18)

Sources: Schriften des Institute für Konjunkturforschung, Sonderheft 45. *Der Künftige Wohnungs- und Siedlungsbau*. Walter Fey, Berlin, 1939, *Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich*, F., Seldte, Berlin, 1938. FEA estimates for emergency shelter program and long-term housing program.

* 1 cubic meter of construction lumber represents 1.43 fm. (Festmeter) of timber, or 1 fm. of timber equals 0.7 cu. m. of construction lumber.

^b Man-hours are figured by dividing the total wages paid in 1937 in all construction industries (3.05 billion RM.) or in dwelling construction (665 million RM.), by the average hourly worker's wage in construction industries in 1937 (0.723 RM.). Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1938.

^c Data not available.

^d The 1937 manufacture and use throughout the Reich include 9½ billion pieces of regular bricks and 3 billion pieces of special bricks (such as *Kalksandsteine*, *Bimasteine*, etc.).

^e Number of workers registered as employed in industries and crafts in 1937.

^f 19,000 bricks were needed in 1937 for the construction of a dwelling unit of 3½-rooms, including kitchen, in a group of 3-story buildings (analyzed in: *Vierteljahresschäfte zur Statistik des deutschen Reichs*, 44 Jg 1935, Heft IV, p. 61). A considerably larger quantity of bricks is required for one-family homes, which are prevalent in smaller communities. The Institut für Konjunkturforschung (Sonderheft 45, Berlin, 1939, in *Der Künftige Wohnung- und Siedlungsbau*, by Dr. W. Fey) sets, therefore, the average 1937 use of bricks per dwelling unit at 25,000 pieces, representing 99 m. t. of weight.

^g Represents an average requirement of 18.6 fm. of timber per dwelling unit.

^h According to the sources mentioned under f, the cement requirements for a 3½-room dwelling unit in a 3-story building averaged 3.3 metric tons. The requirements for one-family homes are considerably larger. They were set at 4.0 metric tons per dwelling unit in 1937.

ⁱ Average use according to sources under f. The steel requirements for worker's dwellings amounted to 1.25 m. t. per unit.

^j Without the cost of land and land improvements and development. Source: Dr. W. Fey, *Der Künftige Wohnung- und Siedlungsbau*, mentioned under f.

^k Source: F. Schöte, *Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich*, Berlin 1933, p. 30.

^l Estimates based on German emergency shelter standards set up by the Housing Commissioner of the Reich, Ley (*Reinische-Westfälische Zeitung*), 31 October 1943.

^m Should mainly be supplied by salvage actions.

ⁿ Could be replaced by lime (burnt locally) and/or clay mortar if not readily available.

^o Consists of nails and hardware mainly. Plumbing should be provided by salvage actions.

^p Estimates based on housing standards, providing for equipment of dwelling units equal to or better than those in use in 1937. A certain degree of rationalization of construction methods resulting in labor, material, and capital savings, as compared to 1937, is taken into account.

APPENDIX B. EVACUATION PROGRAMS UNDER THE NAZI GOVERNMENT

Two evacuation plans have been adopted in Germany: KLV (*Kinderlandverschickung*) for the precautionary evacuation of children of 3 to 14, and a scheme for the evacuation of family units and non-essential adults, both under the auspices of NSV (*Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt*).

The KLV plan provides for placement of children of age 3 to 9 with families in rural communities, and those of 10 to 14 in camps under the supervision of Hitler *Jugend* leaders. The evacuation period was, at first, meant to be 6 to 9 months. There are indications that, at present, the evacuation is of a more permanent nature as a result of the growing shelter crisis in urban centers devastated by aerial warfare. The KLV has recently handled the evacuation of children by classes and sometimes, transferred entire schools in a body. Rural hotels and youth hotels have been used, idle warehouses and vacant castles requisitioned, and customhouse buildings on the former boundaries converted into dormitories. All evacuated children are under constant supervision and care of HJ leaders, teachers, doctors, and nurses. All services are given free to the children. Parents may visit their children after 6 months. Their transportation and stay at the camp are free of charge. The KLV scheme covers all of Germany and provides for transfers of children from danger zones as far as Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Denmark.

In evacuating adults, such as mothers with at least one child under 6, older people, and persons not essential to war production, preference is given to those completely bombed out. The authorities arrange for transportation and for billeting in selected reception areas. Under the NSV plan a province may adopt a city exposed to air attacks, or the authorities determine the area to which evacuees from danger zones will have to transfer. Evacuees are receiving family allowances during their stay in the reception area. They include:

a. Minimum living expenses, depending on the previous income of the evacuee and the local living condition in the reception area.

b. Free lodging in billeted dwellings, or the full amount of rent paid by the evacuee in the reception area.

c. A rent assistance for the evacuee's home residence if it is no longer used by other family members.

d. Sickness assistance and assistance for pregnant and nursing women.

e. Contribution for the education of children, such as costs for schooling.

f. Assistance, obligations, and expenses, such as life insurance, or procurement of essential clothing.

g. In some cases rent for premises of businesses shut down because of evacuation.

h. A special compensation of 20 RM. a month for the family head, 10 RM. for each dependent over 8, and 8 RM. for children under 8.

A deduction is made, however, from these allowances of sums which can be secured for the evacuee from his provider remaining on the job in the home town. The allowances are not to be repaid.¹ Before

¹ *Volksischer Beobachter*, Berlin, 11 August 1943.

leaving the danger zone the evacuee receives a departure certificate from his local ration board, which entitles him to obtain food rations at the Mayor's office in the reception community.

The original reception areas were becoming overcrowded, the transportation system overburdened, and the separation of families affected civilian morale. The tendency now is to evacuate people into the rural areas near their home cities. This new scheme necessitates the building of emergency shelter units (*Behelfsheime*).

APPENDIX C. PRODUCTION OF BASIC BUILDING MATERIALS IN GERMANY

1. Brick and Tile Industries

Plants are generally located where sources of raw materials and fuel are linked by short hauls and cheap transportation to each other and to building sites. The numerous brick works scattered throughout Germany supply normal local needs. But most of the highly mechanized plants are operated by large brown coal mining companies.

About 50 percent of the total number of 4,800 brick works were mechanized. The mechanized plants worked in pre-war years at nearly full capacity throughout the year. Old-fashioned works continue to operate in full until they exhaust the supply of stored "green" bricks that were produced during the summer. Out of the total turn-over of brick and tile industries amounting to 415 million RM., about 20 percent of the plants handled less than 15,000 RM. a year. About 60 percent of the plants had a turn-over of 15,000 to 100,000 RM., and 20 percent more than 100,000 RM. each.²

The output of the brick and tile industry in the year 1936-37 was as follows:

Type of product	Output (billion units)	Weight (million tons)	Percent of total out- put
Common brick	8.3	28.7	58.2
Lime and sand brick ¹	² 2.5	8.3	17.5
Trass-brick ³	⁴ 1.2	4.0	8.4
Roofing tile	1.1	3.5	7.3
Hollow brick	1.0	3.3	7.0
Drain pipes2	---	1.5
Total output	14.3	47.8	100.0

¹ Widely used in Germany.

² 1938 output as estimated by MEW, was about 1.9 billion pieces.

³ Trass is a natural cement brick.

⁴ 1938 output, as estimated by MEW, was about 1.0 billion pieces.

The manpower employed in brick and tile industries in 1936-37 numbered about 173,000. The average productivity varied between 60,000 and 100,000 bricks per man yearly in smaller plants and averaged about 300,000 pieces yearly in the highly mechanized plants. The labor cost amounted to approximately one-third of the value of the output, wage rates for this work being generally below the average level in the area.

² The turn-over of 100,000 RM. represents about 3 million regular bricks.

2. Lumber and Woodworking Industries

The timber reserve of Germany in 1936-37 was about 1.7 billion cubic meters. Broadleaves tend to predominate in the western areas and along the coastal plain, and conifers in Bayern, Sachsen, Schlesien, and Ostpreussen.

The increasing concentration, mechanization, and electrification within the lumber and woodworking industries is indicated in the following table comparing data for 1925 and 1933.³

Production year	Number of enterprises	Workers employed	Enterprises using mechanical power			
			Total number	Total installed	Electric horsepower	Other horsepower
1925.....	220, 375	974, 540	84, 664	1, 052, 127	620, 551	431, 576
1933.....	216, 037	612, 289	116, 517	1, 377, 659	975, 419	402, 240
Increase or decrease (percent).....	-2. 0	-37. 2	-37. 6	+30. 9	+57. 2	-6. 8

This distribution of enterprises by type of production and mechanical power used within German lumber and wood-working industries was as follows: ⁴

Type of production	Number of enterprises	Manpower employed	Mechanical total horse-power	Power installed electric horsepower
Sawmills.....	9, 221	88, 090	416, 652	154, 146
Wooden construction, carpentry.....	112, 714	305, 171	621, 843	555, 729
Woodworking industries.....	14, 152	41, 334	74, 353	47, 144
Container manufacture.....	12, 944	30, 827	65, 081	44, 567
Other ¹	67, 006	146, 867	199, 730	173, 833
Total.....	216, 037	612, 289	1, 377, 659	975, 419

¹ For example, veneer plants, railroad ties, poles and firewood, handles.

The average growth of timber in all Germany for the past 10 years was estimated at about 38 million cubic meters a year. By a constant policy of over-cutting, about 85 percent of the domestic wood consumption was covered.⁵

The annual cut of timber (stem wood including bark) since 1933-34 is listed in the following tabulation:⁶

Production year	Annual cut in mill. CBM	Percent of annual growth	Production year	Annual cut in mill. CBM	Percent of annual growth
1933-34.....	49	129	1938-39.....	58	153
1934-35.....	54	142	1939-40.....	53	139
1935-36.....	52	137	1940-41.....	49	129
1936-37.....	57	150	1941-42.....	53	¹ 139
1937-38.....	60	158	1942-43.....	57	² 150

¹ Estimated.
² Estimated target figure.

³ Without Austria, but including 1927 and 1935 data for the Saar. Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1938. The 1933 census was taken as of 16 June.

⁴ Without Austria, but including the Saar; data for Germany according to the census of 16.6.1933 and for the Saar according to the census of 25.6.1935. Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1938.

⁵ Prior to World War I, 52.8 percent of the yearly timber consumption went to construction industries, 16.2 percent to mining, 12.9 percent to woodworking industries, 3.5 percent for railroad sleepers and poles, and 14.6 percent for pulp (A. Schlomann in *Wood Products*, Nov. 1941).

⁶ Source: MEW report 30.10.1943 based on available data.

The larger part of labor employed in lumbering is seasonal and often classified in census returns under other occupations (primarily agriculture). For the annual cut of 55 to 60 million cubic meters the equivalent of approximately 300,000 to 350,000 full man-years were spent. This work was however distributed over some 2 million persons in pre-war years.

The distribution of employment in the woodworking industries of various sizes was as follows:⁷

Lumber and woodworking industries with—	Number of enterprises	Number of employees	Enterprises using mechanical power	Installed mechanical power in horsepower
Less than 5 employees.....	202, 291	334, 272	103, 742	731, 257
6 to 10 employees.....	7, 598	55, 616	6, 951	149, 430
11 to 50 employees.....	5, 129	107, 803	4, 828	272, 746
51 to 200 employees.....	910	81, 070	887	159, 257
Over 200 employees.....	109	33, 528	109	64, 969
Total.....	216, 037	612, 289	116, 517	1, 377, 659

3. Prefabricated Huts and Barracks

The main consumer of construction lumber is the prefabrication industry. Wooden huts and barracks were originally mass produced for the organization Todt (construction workers) and for the troops, because of their mobility and lightness, and because they require fewer man-hours and less production time as compared to the traditional type of construction. Prefabricated shelter units are now used also to house workers of the Reich Labor Service, labor conscripts, foreign workers, prisoners of war, and bombed-out populations, certain armament work shops, offices, hospitals, auxiliary post offices, railway stations, etc. Owing to this vast demand the prefabrication of wooden structures developed into an important industry.

Several million soldiers, workers, and air-raid victims are actually housed in prefabricated structures. The type most commonly used was designed for Todt workers and later adopted by the army for troop housing. A larger type (marked BFN) measures 42½ meters by 12, sheltering 144 men and providing 3.5 square meters or (35 square feet) floor space per person. The BFN barracks has about 3,000 subassemblies of 82 types, all fabricated mechanically.

It has been reported that Switzerland and Sweden were also working on German orders for prefabricated wooden structures. Finland, Norway, France, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Croatia are manufacturing sections of wooden barracks and huts or complete units for the *Wehrmacht*, and also are delivering lumber for processing in German plants. All wooden construction is coordinated and standardized. A decentralized production of special assemblies in separate plants is therefore possible and practicable, realizing additional economies in labor, materials, and transportation.

Plywood huts are a new development. Wall and roof sections are insulated and held together by clamps. A building consisting of 12 rectangular wall sections and 12 wedged-shaped roof sections can be

⁷ Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1938.

erected in 55 minutes by 10 men. Originally invented in Finland they are now widely used. Shipping for this type of prefabricated barracks is reduced by 80 percent as compared to other types.

4. Cement and Lime Industries

The distribution of basic raw materials facilitated a certain degree of decentralization of German cement industry. But considerable consumption of electric power and fuel in cement production⁸ contributed to a concentration of major plants in coal-mining districts (around Beckum-Lippstadt-Paderborn in Westfalen; near Osnabruck, Hannover, Halle, Berlin, and Oppeln; in the Neckar, Lahn, and Main valleys and throughout Bavaria; the plants at Beckum, Buren and Geseke in eastern Germany developed into important centers of cement industry for the occupied eastern territories).

Official production figures (April 1936) estimated the workable processing capacity at 14.4 million tons (of which 11.5 million tons were portland cement). Out of this total capacity 1.4 million tons could not be produced economically, although the plants were in good repair. Another 1.5 million tons (above the total of 14.4 million tons) represented the capacity of plants in bad state of repair.⁹ In 1939 there were 150 plants with an estimated capacity of over 200,000 tons each, and another 30 processing between 100,000 and 200,000 tons a year. Both wet and dry processes of manufacture are extensively used.

The following table, from official data, shows the growth of production between 1933 and 1938:

Year	Total output	Output of portland cement	Year	Total output	Output of portland cement
1933-----	3. 820	3. 111	1936-----	11. 689	9. 399
1934-----	6. 470	5. 331	1937-----	12. 605	10. 037
1935-----	8. 807	7. 257	1938-----	¹ 15. 956	13. 500

¹ Sales, including about 695,000 tons for Austria, according to MEW.

Approximately 20,000 workers were employed in the cement industry in 1936, including 4,000 engaged in limestone quarries. Their wages for the same year totaled 41.5 million RM.

Because of increasing restriction in the use of structural steel, mass-fabrication of reinforced concrete slabs and beams has been promoted. Installation of some 30 factories manufacturing pre-cast structural building elements in reinforced concrete was planned in 1940. Attempts have been made to replace reinforcing bars and wire mesh by vegetable fibers and wood.

The most important lime-producing areas in Germany are at Ahl-bingerode, Rubeland, Huttenrode, Diez a. d. Lahn, Liegntz in Schlesien, Kalkberg i. d. Mark, Oppeln, Dornap, Dornap-Mahnenfurth, Aprath, Hagen-Oberhagen, Iserlohn, Menden, Lehmathe, Gruiten, Mochldahl, Neandertal, Köln and Rheinland. In addition, there are important lime works throughout the Narz and central Germany,

⁸ According to MEW estimates for Germany, 60-100 KWH of electricity plus 0.5 to 0.7 m. t. of coal are required to produce 1 m. t. of cement.

⁹ Unofficial German data for 1938 estimated the total capacity of the cement industry as 17 million tons.

Sachsen, and the Danube valley. Most Portland cement factories make hydraulic lime as a sideline. As in the case of brick and cement production, the coal cost and difficulty of transport in wartime are considerable problems.

In 1937, there were approximately 800 limestone quarries in Germany, of which 690 are equipped with kilns. The annual output of limestone quarries in 1936 reached about 12 million tons, burnt lime 5½ million tons, and other products of lime-kilns 2½ million tons. The industry had a steady increase in turn-over between 1933 and 1936 (from 72 to 140 million RM).

Limestone quarries and lime-kilns employed about 25,000 persons in 1936, nearly double the number employed in 1933. Employment is seasonal, being lowest in winter and highest in summer. Workers' wages amounted to nearly 49 million RM in 1936.

7. Structural Steel

Germany has a surplus rolling capacity for structural steel and sufficient fabrication facilities for other metal products required for construction purposes. However, their present production is severely limited both in type and in quantity. The use of steel has been controlled, together with other critical building materials, since the initiation of the rearmament. Steel, lumber, and cement allocations to the claimant were tied to each other, by decree of the General Commissioner for Construction Industries.¹⁰

Category of construction	Allocation per M. T. of structural steel		Category of construction	Allocation per M. T. of structural steel	
	CBM of lumber	M. T. of cement		CBM of lumber	M. T. of cement
<i>Wehrmacht</i>	0.85	1.10-3.10	Utilities.....	0.15	0.70
Public buildings.....	2.00	2.20	Public works.....	.12	3.60
Industrial structures.....	.31	1.25	Motor highways.....	.25	17.00
Commercial structures.....	1.40	1.90	Soil conservation.....	.35	1.80
<i>Reichsbahn</i>63	2.80	Workers, housing.....	8.30	4.80
<i>Reichspost</i>80	2.70	Private housing.....	6.00	3.50
Food-processing plants, silos.....	1.60	2.80			

The objective of the measure is to save labor, materials, fuel, and transportation through appropriate selection and minimum use of the several building materials.

The 1937 use of steel in Germany for all purposes was approximately 17 million tons, of which 5.7 million tons were consumed by all construction industries. The 720,000 metric tons utilized in the same year for the provision of housing represent 12.6 percent of the steel used by all construction industries or 2 percent of total steel consumption in the Reich.

8. Sheet Glass

The principal production centers for sheet glass are in Westfalen and Rheinland (including the Saar), Bayern, Schlesien, and Torgau on the Elbe (northeast of Leipzig).

¹⁰ 12 September 1938; Source: *Reichsverteidigungs Gesetzgebung, Bauwirtschaft*, Berlin.

The following table shows the output of sheet glass in Germany in 1937:

Type of product	Area in million sq. feet	Percent of total area	Output in M. T.	Percent of total weight
Sheet glass.....	325.1	90	143,000	78
Colored sheet glass.....	7.6	2	3,000	2
Plate glass.....	28.5	8	37,000	20
Total output.....	361.2	100	183,000	100

The number of sheet-glass works in 1929 was about 5,000. Nearly half of Germany's sheet-glass production comes from one firm, *Deutsche Tafelglas A. G.*, with three main factories at Weiden in Bayern, at Witten-Krengeldanz, and Kunzendorf in Schlesien.

The manufacture of flat glass in Germany is estimated to consume approximately 200,000 tons of sand per annum, 40,000 tons of soda, 60,000 tons of lime, and 250,000 tons of fuel.¹¹

According to the German Press (June 1943) the production of sheet glass dropped in the first months of the war. Mechanization of the production and the addition of the Sudeten plants resulted in a gradual increase of the output. But window glass for repair of air-raid damage is still scarce. Since August 1943, deliveries of sheet glass have taken place only on receipt of a glass coupon (*Glasmarke*).

It is reported that a new window-glass substitute (*Rollglas*) for repairs has been developed, consisting of a transparent, waterproof plastic. It can be rolled, cut like paper, and nailed to window frames. Unlike glass, it is flexible, and transmits ultra-violet rays, but will not stand high temperature.

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¹¹ Rough estimates by MEW.

HOUSING AND BUILDING MATERIALS IN GERMANY

B. Administration

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SUMMARY

1. The limited amount of construction work at present carried on in Germany is subject to numerous regulations administered by a large number of authorities. On the local level much responsibility rests with the mayors and county chairmen; on the national and regional levels many new authorities have been created, under strong Nazi influence.

2. The administrative regulations, in substance, cover (a) the administration of existing facilities and their allocation to the population; (b) the administration of new construction, repair, and alteration works. With reference to the former and, more specifically, with reference to the Tenant Protection and Reich Rent Laws, much reliance will have to be placed on the existing legislation, which in part has been in force for a number of decades and the minute details of which cannot easily be replaced by new arrangements during the initial period of military occupation.

3. The short-run problems of administering the shelter program are essentially local in character and much reliance will have to be placed upon the initiative and cooperation of the local authorities. Financial aid which formerly was forthcoming from central authorities may have to be replaced by local sources of finance. In the absence of these the occupation authorities will make available means of payment under the rules and procedures of Military Government.

4. On the national level, the policy-making functions of the Reich Ministry of Labor were transferred under the Nazi regime to a number of newly created agencies, which also assumed executive functions in the field of housing and construction. These agencies include the Reich Housing Commissioner, the Commissioner General for the Regulation of the Building Industry, and the Reich Commissioner for Wood Construction. On the regional level, the jurisdictions of these authorities coincide with those of the military districts (*Rüstungsinspektionen*) and party *Gaue*, respectively. It is proposed to eliminate the offices of the Reich Housing Commissioner, Commissioner General for the Regulation of the Building Industry, and Reich Commissioner for Wood Construction, and have the central policy-making functions again in a central German labor authority. On the regional level, it may prove necessary to institute new regional housing offices, the areas of which should not coincide either with the military districts or with the party *Gaue*. If operations on a lower regional level prove necessary, it is proposed to use the office of the district president (*Regierungspräsident*) in Prussia and corresponding authorities in the other States.

5. The volume of new construction, which is now limited by a number of stringent regulations, may increase under military occupation as labor and materials are freed from war uses. In the absence of readily available private funds, the present system of financing new construction may have to be retained in its principal outlines. Although the various institutions providing mortgage credit have ceased lending operations during the war, it may be desirable to place greater emphasis on these agencies as sources of credit for construction work. It is expected, however, with respect to the control of

investments, that for the initial period of military occupation the controls imposed on the issuance of new bonds, and related administrative measures, will be retained.

6. For the initial period of military occupation at least, it seems necessary to retain the miscellaneous controls which have been imposed on mortgages, forced sales, and real estate transactions in general. The large-scale repayment of mortgage credit has been postponed time and again since the thirties, and economic conditions during the period of military occupation will not be favorable for lifting the moratorium.

7. It is proposed to modify the emergency legislation setting up priorities for the disposal of dwelling space. These provisions should be replaced by objective standards which are open to examination and control and do not leave the authorities too much discretion. Under no condition must any sort of discrimination either in favor of Nazi groups or against others be permitted.

8. During military occupation, recourse to the central administrative agencies may not always be open, and the need for an elastic solution of housing problems will make it necessary to rely on local initiative and authority to the largest possible extent. For this reason the power of the local authorities to make ordinances in matters pertaining to housing should be strengthened. At present this power is restricted by the exclusive character of national decrees.

9. To a considerable extent, emergency facilities will consist of quarters which are, or can be made, suitable for accommodating large numbers of people—hotels, schools, army barracks, restaurants, breweries, theaters, and gymnasiums. The police power of the municipalities will supply a suitable legal basis for requisitioning such facilities. It will, however, be necessary to confer farther-reaching authority on the municipalities if they are to be enabled to requisition facilities now under the jurisdiction of the Reich, the States, and other public bodies.

I. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM

A. Introduction; General Organization


It is proposed, in Part A of this Guide presenting the program for housing under Military Government, that immediate steps be taken toward two general ends: the utilization of all available existing housing, and the construction of emergency housing. The machinery necessary for the administration of this program is considered below. (The long-term housing program, which is linked with construction undertaken in the emergency program, and is consequently discussed in Part A, will not be an administrative problem for Military Government, and is therefore not considered here.)

Before making recommendations as to machinery to be set up by Military Government in this field, it is necessary to examine the administrative system which presently prevails, at least some vestiges of which Military Government will encounter when the country is occupied. (A chart of this is presented on the following page.) Control of housing and construction is vested in a number of general governmental agencies at the national, regional, and local levels,

sharing a wide degree of authority for the many aspects of housing, frequently without clear distinction as to primary responsibility. In the great majority of cases, the actual exercise of authority takes place at the local level—by mayors, county chairmen, and local representatives of national organizations—who carry out the policy decisions made at the regional or national level.

On the national level, there are, in the main, three organizations operating in the field of housing policy. These are the Reich Housing Commissioner, the Minister for Armaments and War Production, and the Commissioner General for the Regulation of the Building Industry. Apart from these agencies, the German Labor Front and the

PRESENT ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION



National Socialist People's Welfare Organization fulfill certain functions in the field of housing.

1. Reich Housing Commissioner.—The central policy-making and administrative power in the field of housing is vested in the Reich Housing Commissioner, who has taken over the functions of the Reich Minister of Labor in these matters. Apparently considerable use is made by the Commissioner of the personnel attached to the Housing Section of the Ministry of Labor. The Commissioner Ley, is also head of the German Labor Front (*Deutsche Arbeitsfront*). On the regional level, housing policies are in the hands of the *Gauleiters* of the Nazi party, who act as *Gau Housing Commissioners*. Their functions are implemented by the appointment of experts as heads of the *Gau* directorate (*Gauführungsstab*) of the German Housing Relief Scheme (*Deutsches Wohnungshilfswerk*). Apparently these officers were designed to coordinate the work of the local authorities (mayors and county chairmen) and issue regulations and instructions to them.

2. Reich Ministry of Armaments and War Production.—Various in-

strumentalities of Speer's Ministry of Armaments and War Production (*Reichsministerium für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion*) participate in the regulation of construction work. These instrumentalities include the Office for Construction (*Amt Bau*), to which in turn there are attached the Main Committee for Construction (*Hauptausschuss Bau*), the Economic Group "Construction Industry" (*Wirtschaftsgruppe Bauindustrie*), and the office of the Reich Commissioner for Wood Construction (*Reichsbeauftragter für den Holzbau*).

a. *The Main Committee for Construction (Hauptausschuss Bau).* This committee is designed as a self-government organ of the construction industry. It consists of the directors of Special Committees (*Sonderausschüsse*) and operates through 16 offices (*Arbeitsstäbe*) dealing with general questions, machinery, labor supply, technology, improvement of production, standardization, transportation, administration and organization, stone and earth, timber, steel, and small enterprises. The Special Committees are centrally organized for the Reich and coordinated by the Main Committee. On the regional level the Main Committee operates through Regional and Gau Deputies (*Bezirks- und Gaubeauftragte*) for the area of each military district (*Rüstungsinspektion*). In conjunction with the Special Committees, the Regional and Gau Deputies supervise the work of Special Agents (*Bezirkliche Vertrauensmänner*) who are appointed for the area of each military district and for each quota claimant (i. e. the army, air force, Organization Todt, railways, postal administration, etc.) if the quota claimant has several projects in the military district. The Special Agents coordinate the various projects of the quota claimants and supervise the work of committees (*Arbeitsausschüsse*) which operate directly on each larger construction project, supervising it and directing the utilization of labor, machinery, and materials. These committees are composed of experts who have knowledge of local conditions.

The Main Committee, the Special Committees, and the regional deputies use the existing machinery of the Economic Group "Construction Industry" and of the Reich Guild "Handicraft."

b. *Economic Group "Construction Industry" (Wirtschaftsgruppe Bauindustrie).* The construction industry is organized in the Economic Group "Construction Industry." A brief summary of the structure and organization of this Group is given in Appendix A.

c. *Reich Commissioner for Wood Construction (Reichsbeauftragter für den Holzbau).* This agency, which is attached to the Office for Construction in the Ministry of Armaments and War Production, has important functions in the allocation of timber for housing construction. The agency is closely connected with the wood construction cartel (*Deutscher Holzverband*). On the regional level, the Commissioner operates through regional deputies and utilizes the offices of the cartel.

3. *Commissioner General for the Regulation of the Building Industry (Generalbevollmächtigter für die Regelung der Bauwirtschaft).*—This office, which is held by Minister Speer,¹ is apparently part of Goer-

¹ Speer holds the following positions: in charge of preparatory works pertaining to the post-war reconstruction of bombed cities, Minister for Armaments and War Production, Commissioner General for Armament Tasks in the Four-Year Plan Office, Inspector General for Water and Energy, Inspector General for Roads, Commissioner General for the Regulation of the Building Industry.

ing's office of Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan. Speer in his capacity as Commissioner General for the Regulation of the Building Industry cooperates closely with the agencies in charge of building in the Speer Ministry of Armaments and War Production, the functions of which have been outlined above. Together with the Reich Commissioner for Wood Construction, the General Commissioner for the Regulation of the Building Industry participates in the allocation of quotas for building materials. This part of his work is more fully discussed below. He has under him regional deputies (*Baubevollmächtigte*) whose regions coincide with the military districts. In general, his task has been to limit the industry's functions to the most urgent needs and thus to adjust the volume of construction to the capacity of the industry, with a view to increasing efficiency and removing an important factor in the rising cost of construction.

According to recent information, the Office of Construction (*Amt Bau*) in the Speer Ministry of Armaments and War Production has apparently assumed the bulk of the functions formerly held by Speer as Commissioner General for the Regulation of the Building Industry. It is stated that only "basic decrees" are issued under the authority of "The Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan, Reich Minister Speer, Commissioner General for the Regulation of the Building Industry," while all others are issued under the authority of the Reich Minister of Armaments and War Production (Speer). Speer thus seems to have shifted the bulk of the operations in the field of construction from an agency operating under Goering as Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan to his Ministry of Armaments and War Production, which operates immediately under Hitler.

4. German Labor Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront).—Although its connection with housing and building construction is more remote, the German Labor Front must be mentioned among the national agencies operating in the field of housing. The Labor Front has promoted building assistance schemes and related developments. Its housing agencies (Reich Housing Office or *Reichsheimstättenamt*, and *Gau* Housing Offices) are charged with the direction of all housing measures taken by the organizations of the Nazi party, the Labor Front and affiliated organizations. The work of the state authorities (mayors, county chairmen), in turn, is coordinated by the *Gau* Housing Commissioners operating under the Reich Housing Commissioner (see above).

5. National Socialist People's Welfare Organization (Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt, NSV).—The NSV has some limited functions in the field of housing. For example, its Main Office for People's Welfare (*Hauptamt für Volkswohlfahrt*) was instructed early in 1943 to prepare an inventory of facilities which could be made available for evacuated persons. The NSV also participates in the remuneration of proprietors whose dwellings have been used for billeting, and has had some functions in connection with repair and alteration of existing buildings.

The functions of the public housing agencies are divided into new construction, emergency measures such as repairs, alteration, and reconversion, and housing finance.

B. New Construction

In a Decree of 15 March 1943 the Reich Housing Commissioner had prohibited, for the duration, the construction of regular housing facilities of normal type, with provisions made for exceptions which would require individual permits. In general, the Decree provided that all housing construction work must be executed upon the basis of wartime standardization and be limited to the erection of emergency facilities.

In later decrees, the Reich Housing Commissioner specified the procedures for financing wartime housing construction. The wartime construction projects are administered by the municipalities, which in turn may utilize the cooperation of the nonprofit housing corporations. (See Appendix B.)

The lot is to be made available by the municipalities, by expropriation if necessary. However, if the expense involved in the acquisition of the lot cannot be borne by the municipality, a grant may be provided by the Reich. The Reich will also advance the construction cost without requiring mortgage security. If the municipality utilizes the services of a nonprofit housing corporation, an allowance for the administrative expenses of the latter may be added to the construction cost. If the dwellings are to be used by members of a specific business concern, the latter must make a contribution to the construction cost. This contribution is not construed as a loan.

No interest or amortization is determined for the funds advanced for the construction cost by the Reich. These advances are to be repaid by the municipalities in accordance with future regulations, and it is promised that the amount to be paid will be in relation to the definitive value of the dwellings as determined at some future date. In consequence it is expected that a varying proportion of the advances made by the Reich will not have to be repaid by the municipalities.

Tenants of the newly constructed dwellings must pay an equitable rent to which the Reich will not make any contribution. The municipality may retain a portion of the rent necessary to cover current expenses and interest on the purchasing price for the ground. The rest must be paid into an account at the disposal of the Deutsche Bau- und Rodenbank, an instrumentality of the Reich.

Requisitions for the construction of standardized barracks can originate from six different sources.

a. The armed services, each of the four branches acting independently.

b. The Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police.

c. The General Commissioner for the Regulation of the Building Industry.

At present requests for barrack construction are centrally collected by these six agencies and then transferred to the Reich Commissioner for Wood Construction (*Reichsbeauftragter für den Holzbau*), who, in conjunction with the wood construction cartel (*Deutscher Holzbanverband*) and the General Commissioner for the Regulation of the Building Industry, is in charge of overall quotas for necessary materials.

The production of barracks is highly standardized and concentrated among the most efficient firms.

The Reich Commissioner for Wood Construction assigns the orders

for barracks construction to the individual firms distributing orders so as to minimize the burden on transportation.

For the duration of the war new lending operations on the part of the traditional institutions providing long-term credit for housing construction, i. e., of the mortgage-bond institutions, savings banks, and insurance companies, have been eliminated. No mortgage bonds can be issued. To some extent at least these measures are designed to eliminate from the market for long-term investments any securities which would compete with the issues of the Reich.

The relative importance of the various institutions before the war can be seen from the following table showing urban mortgages of institutional lenders in Germany, 31 December 1937:²

<i>Credit institution:</i>	<i>Amount of urban mortgages held, in Reichsmarks</i>
Banks -----	22, 300, 000
Savings banks -----	6, 055, 000, 000
Urban cooperative banks -----	¹ 150, 000, 000
Mortgage banks -----	7, 459, 500, 000
Private life insurance companies -----	1, 983, 500, 000
Public life insurance institutions -----	284, 400, 000
Social insurance institutions -----	1, 394, 600, 000
Total -----	17, 249, 300, 000

¹ Estimated.

The mortgage banks and related institutions issue bonds which are quoted on the stock exchange and from the proceeds of these bonds grant credit secured by mortgages. Most of their credit transactions concern first mortgages and the loans are usually limited to 40-60 percent of the value of land and buildings unless the loan is guaranteed by the Reich or another public body.

The savings banks and other lending institutions follow similar credit policies.

In conclusion mention must be made of certain instrumentalities of the Reich and other public bodies which are active in the field of housing, and of special types of organizations, semipublic and private, which promote building activities for their members or a wider group of the public.

Among the instrumentalities of the Reich, most important is the Deutsche Bau- und Bodenbank, the structure and operations of which are more fully described in Appendix B. This appendix also contains analyses of some of the more important types of private or semipublic organizations active in the field of building, such as the nonprofit housing corporations (*gemeinnützige Wohnungsunternehmen*), and Building and Loan Associations (*Bausparkassen*).

C. Repair and Alteration Works; Reconversion and More Intensive Utilization of Existing Facilities

These measures are applied in conformity with a number of decrees which are outlined in Appendix E, below. The most important of the legislative measures include the following:

a. Hitler Decree of 23 October 1942. Established Ley as Reich

² No exact figures are available for urban mortgages of private lenders. They may be in the neighborhood of 7 billion Reichsmarks.

Housing Commissioner and brought the *Gauleiters* into positions of authority at the regional level.

b. The Decree for the Regulation of Housing Space of 27 February 1943 (*Verordnung zur Wohnraumlenkung*). This Decree grants broad powers to *Gauleiters* and municipalities to locate, alter, and reconvert dwelling space and to establish preferred groups of occupants.

c. The Decree for the Supply of Housing Space for the Bombed-Out Population of 21 June 1943 (*Verordnung zur Wohnraumversorgung der luftkriegsbetroffenen Bevölkerung*). This decree deals specifically with requisitioning of dwelling space for bombed-out persons and places them in a higher priority than any other group. "Bombed-out persons" includes those precautionarily evacuated.

d. First Executive Order, of 8 March 1943, dealing with the same matter;

e. Second Executive Order, of 23 March 1943, dealing with the same matter;

f. Third Executive Order, of 27 September 1943, dealing with the same matter.

g. The Reich Law on Exactions of 1 September 1939 (*Reichsleistungsgesetz*), which deals with national service in general. This law gives civil authorities the power to requisition dwelling space a power formerly held only by the military in an emergency. These powers are in some respects broader than those granted under (b) above. This law is important because the *Gauleiters* have no formal part in its execution.

The more permanent legislative measures of the Reich, the Tenant Protection Law (*Mieterschutzgesetz*) and the Reich Rent Law (*Reichsmietengesetz*) are discussed in Appendix B. There are also legislative measures of the states pertaining to police administration, such as, in Prussia, the Police Administration Law of 1 June 1931 (*Polizeiverwaltungsgesetz*), which are of importance in this connection.

These measures are to be applied by the administrative authorities for coping with the normal phenomena of homelessness, i. e., of homelessness not produced by wartime conditions. They vest in the lower administrative and local police agencies the power of billeting homeless people and impose upon them the duty of making adequate provisions for coping with the described conditions.

D. Financial Measures

Supplementary legislative measures in the field of housing are in the main concerned with the settlement of the financial issues which arise out of the application of the emergency measures. As will be seen from the survey of this legislation in Appendix F, a large part of it is of a highly technical character, and while certain sections of it will no longer be applicable under military occupation owing to the cessation of bombing, other sections will continue to determine financial relationships between public bodies and landlords and tenants.

The legislative measures include the following enactments of the Reich Housing Commissioner:

a. The First Reich Decree on Grants-in-Aid (*Erster Reichsbeihilfeerlass*) of 8 March 1943.

b. Circular of 12 August 1943, dealing with the same matter. The contents of these decrees and the terms on which Reich grants may be obtained are more fully discussed in Appendix F, below.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. General Organization

During the initial period of military occupation, the provision of shelter will to a large degree be the business of the local authorities. The existing legislation in the main is broad enough to enable them to continue in the execution of this function. New operations of the central authorities will presumably be of relatively minor importance; it might thus become necessary for the local agencies to assume some of the responsibilities previously borne by the central authorities. Existing legislation should, in the main, be retained for the time being. So-called self-help arrangements designed to enable prospective inhabitants to build the facilities they desire to inhabit should be encouraged.

The following more specific recommendations are designed to eliminate Nazi control in the field of housing, amend the existing legislation in certain respects, provide for the necessary financial arrangements and indicate the main lines which the flow of capital for housing construction will follow under military occupation.

In order to eliminate Nazi control, the office of the Reich Housing Commissioner should be dissolved. One possibility would be to vest in a central German Labor authority the responsibilities of the Reich Housing Commissioner. The Ministry of Labor was in charge of housing policy during the twenties and thirties. Administration of the Building Assistance Schemes of the Labor Front and related housing activities of that organization may also be transferred to the central German labor authority.

The principal responsibility can be expected to rest with the local authorities (mayors, county chairmen). If the jurisdiction of the national authorities should extend over too wide an area, either the provincial presidents or, preferably, the district presidents (*Regierungspräsidenten*) in Prussia, and the Ministries or corresponding authorities in States other than Prussia, may be entrusted with the fulfillment of functions in the field of housing.

It is also recommended that the following functions be vested in the central German authority for labor: Speer's jurisdiction over future reconstruction of cities; housing activities of the National Socialist People's Welfare Organization and, in conjunction with a central German economics authority, supervision over activities of the "industrial groups" and related bodies in the field of housing, provided that they are retained. The leading personnel of these groups is bound to be strongly Nazified and considerable replacement will be necessary if the groups are retained under military occupation.

The Offices of the General Commissioner for the Regulation of the Building Industry and of the Commissioner for Wood Construction and the *Hauptausschuss Bau* are specific wartime agencies and are strongly under Nazi influence. It is recommended that they be dissolved. If it is desired to maintain controls over buildings materials.

such controls should be exercised by the central German authority for labor in conjunction with the central authority for economics.

The regions of a new decentralized administrative organization should not coincide with those of the *Rüstungsinspektionen* (armament inspectorates) nor with those of the *Gaue*.³ Both types of regional organizations are compromised by their association with military or Nazi party activities.

It is recommended that the laws modifying the rules of the Civil Code with respect to the landlord-tenant relations, i. e., the Rent Control Law and the Tenant Protection Law, be retained. At times restricted and at other times expanded in the range of their application, these laws have been in force for approximately 20 years and their elimination at the time of a severe shortage of housing space would be bound to create intolerable conditions. It is recommended, however, that such amendments to these laws as have been enacted during the thirties, removing certain groups of the population from the protection of these laws, be rescinded. Present price-control measures in the field of construction are outlined in Appendix D. Such measures of price control as are kept in force during the period of military occupation should strictly be applied to building cost and the cost of building materials. During the occupation period some of the factors accounting for the increase in building cost may no longer operate; others may have to be met by means of suitable regulations and control measures as well as by a reform of such contracting procedures as have developed in response to wartime exigencies. It is recommended that for public building during the period of military occupation the rules of the *Verdingungsordnung für Bauleistungen* be enforced again. This will be feasible, however, only under a stable general level of prices.

B. New Construction

The various legislative regulations pertaining to new construction, financing, alteration, and repair works (Appendices E, F) should in the main be retained. With respect to new construction, it is recommended that the Decree of the Reich Housing Commissioner of 15 March 1943 be modified in the light of such conditions as will emerge during the period of military occupation. At present new construction is, in the main, limited to barracks, and the operations are subject to a number of more or less stringent regulations. Under military occupation it may be possible to relax these rules gradually to the extent to which materials and labor are no longer absorbed by other tasks. It is also recommended that the system of financing new construction, in its principal outlines, be continued. The disposal of the account of the Deutsche Bau- und Bodenbank (see below, Appendix B) may be left with the central German authority for labor, which may use this fund for financing new housing construction or related measures of housing policy.

In financing a long-term building program, recourse must be had to the various institutions providing mortgage credit.

For some time the volume of new business of these institutions has been extremely small owing to the restriction on new building during

³ See Civil Affairs Guide on *Territorial Units To Be Used by Military Government in Germany*.

wartime and the absorption of private funds by the loans floated by the Reich. There is accumulated, however, a considerable amount of private savings which would under favorable conditions be available for building construction. In the absence of such conditions much reliance will have to be placed on a publicly promoted and financed building program. The program itself is outlined in Part A of this Guide. With respect to the administrative and financial aspects of the matter, it will be necessary to look to public bodies for outright grants, credits, or guarantees. These can be obtained from the proceeds of taxes or from other income at the disposal of the Reich or other public bodies.

There are a number of other administrative devices which will be found useful if it is desired to stimulate building activity. Some of these are as follows:

- a. Quick amortization of the new buildings for tax purposes.
- b. Exemption of income from new buildings from the income tax for a specified length of time.
- c. Similar exemptions from the property tax, land tax, and other taxes.
- d. Exemption from the real property acquisition tax (*Grunderwerbsteuer*) if land is acquired for the purposes of building construction.

The Deutsche Bau und Bodenbank and similar instrumentalities of the Reich should be retained under military occupation and their top personnel subjected to strict scrutiny. The work of the nonprofit housing corporations and of the building and loan associations should be encouraged. Such changes in the personnel of the nonprofit housing corporations and the building and loan associations as are required will have to be made by the Reich Control Office for Private Insurance (*Reichsaufsichtsamt für Privatversicherung*) and other agencies regulating the business practices of these institutions.

Regulation of this flow of funds into housing may assume the following forms: With respect to real capital, allocation procedures may guide productive resources and manpower into such channels as are regarded desirable by the authorities. With respect to forms of capital other than real capital, the authorities may impose restrictions on new issues of bonds, stocks, or other securities; it may require permits for investments in general and it may prohibit certain types of investments altogether.

With respect to real capital (i. e., the resources required for housing construction), administrative and control measures in the field of housing will be a part of the general framework of control over productive resources as it is outlined in other Civil Affairs Guides. The intensity of these controls will depend on a number of factors only indirectly related to the general field of housing. Such factors include alternative uses for raw materials, degree of scarcity of the various materials, industrial relocation, population movements, as well as the general problem of the fate of the German heavy industries.

With respect to the control of investments, it is expected that for the initial period of military occupation the controls imposed on the issuance of new bonds, and related administrative measures should be retained. During this period much of the new work done in the

field of housing will have to be financed by means of advances by the central authorities. As soon as conditions become more favorable with respect to private capital investments, the controls may be gradually relaxed. Private investment in new housing will be facilitated by conditions of economic and political stability as well as by greater certainty concerning the pattern of industrial location in Germany.

For the initial period of military occupation at least it seems necessary to retain the miscellaneous controls which have been imposed on mortgages, forced sales, and real estate transactions in general. The time for the repayment of mortgage credit has been postponed in certain ways successively and continuously since the thirties. Having the mortgages come due during the initial period of military occupation would involve major upheavals on the long-term capital market and would greatly impede the financial operations of the newly constituted authorities. For the same reason, the restrictions on forced sales of real estate, which have been in effect since approximately the same time, should be retained. Real estate transactions in general are subject to the price-stop decrees and a variety of other controls of long standing. In order to check an inflationary raise in the price of real estate, it is recommended that these controls be retained.

C. Repair and Alteration Works; Reconversion and More Intensive Utilization of Existing Facilities

The need for special emergency facilities will vary in the different regions. It is thus desirable to leave jurisdiction over such facilities with the municipalities. They are best equipped to appraise local needs as well as facilities.

The emergency facilities will largely consist of quarters which are suitable for housing considerable numbers of people and of housing facilities which are to be remodelled for that purpose.

The most suitable buildings for such uses will be those which contain a large number of small rooms. Owing to the partial cessation of civilian travel, the municipalities will be in a position to requisition hotels. School buildings, army barracks, and similar quarters may have to be equipped with beds, facilities for cooking, and the like. In the case of need, large rooms in restaurants, breweries, theaters, and gymnasiums will be converted into dormitories. These will, at first, be made available to single persons. If families are to be housed in such quarters, partitions must be made available.

The police power of the municipalities will supply a suitable legal basis for requisitioning such facilities. It will, however, be necessary to confer farther-reaching authority on the municipalities if the latter are to be enabled to requisition facilities under the jurisdiction of the Reich, the States, and other public bodies.

The substance of the emergency legislation of recent years will have to be retained although simplification in general and modifications of specific regulations are warranted. Maintenance of this legislation is required because of the existing shortage of dwelling space which must be made available in accordance with a definite set of rules. The elaboration of a new system of regulations, if this is desired, will be a lengthy process, and the need for dwelling space

during the transitional period entails maintenance of the framework of existing laws. Control can be relaxed to the extent to which new housing facilities are constructed, but considerable time is bound to elapse until a new building program will have advanced far enough to remove the need for control legislation.

In this connection special attention must be paid to the conversion of attics and garrets for housing purposes. Such conversion economizes building material and can be accomplished in a short time. In order to facilitate such conversion, the municipalities should be instructed to relax the provisions of building ordinances which restrict the use of these facilities for dwellings.

While it is proposed to retain the substance of the emergency legislation, certain specific regulations should be modified. With respect to the Decree for the Regulation of Housing Space of 27 February 1943 (see Appendix E), the provisions setting up "privileged," "favored," and "worthy" groups should be eliminated and replaced by objective standards which are open to examination and control and do not leave the authorities too much discretion in this matter.

Under no conditions must it be permitted that any sort of discrimination either in favor of Nazi groups or against others be continued. Groups to which preference might be granted under military occupation could include (a) families with a large number of young children; (b) persons living under housing conditions which constitute a health menace.

Modifications of this Decree may also be desirable if the military authorities intend to control population movements by imposing corresponding restrictions on the utilization of housing space, for example, by exempting new inhabitants from the benefits of the Decree.

As pointed out in Appendix E, specific regulations prevail for dwellings built for groups of employees of a company. It may be desirable to modify this special regulation and subject such facilities fully to the Decree.

In the Executive Order of 27 September 1943 reference is made to the Decree for the Supply of Housing Space for the Bombed-Out Population, and it is stated that this Decree shall supersede all other legislative measures in this field of housing policy, apart from the Reich Law on Exactions. Since this order thus makes unlawful all local police ordinances covering the same ground, it is recommended that it be amended in such a way as to enable local authorities to promulgate local police ordinances dealing with the provision of shelter for homeless persons. During military occupation recourse to the central administrative agencies may not always be open, and an elastic solution of housing problems will make it necessary to rely on local initiative and authority to the largest possible extent.

D. Financial Measures

It is recommended that the system of grants for emergency measures be retained. If no central organization is available to make grants-in-aid, the military authorities may provide means of payment in accordance with the structure of Military Government.

With respect to the procedure provided for the making of Reich grants for subdivision and repair and related measures of housing policy under the Decree of 8 March 1943, it is important to know that

at some earlier time the application needed the endorsement of the district leader (*Kreisamtsleitung*) of the Nazi People's Welfare Organization (NSV, *National-sozialistische Volkswohlfahrt*).⁴ At the present time this requirement has been eliminated presumably for reasons of administrative efficiency and simplification in the face of a growing burden of work. If it should be revived in one form or another, the military administrator will have to make adequate provisions for enabling the administrative agencies to arrive at independent decisions, or, if that should not prove feasible, for substituting an endorsement of the local relief and welfare agencies for that of any party organization.

In this connection mention must be made of still another activity of the NSV. As has been seen, Reich grants are given for repair and related works connected with the reconversion of dwellings and the like. In many cases the Reich grant was supplemented by contributions from the NSV amounting to as much as 25 percent of the cost involved. In view of the anticipated elimination of the NSV, these Reich grants may often have to be given to the full extent of the expenses involved. Under certain circumstances, this is permitted even under the present law. If necessary, the law may be modified to permit more liberal policy in this respect.

⁴ See Civil Affairs Guide *Public and Private Welfare in Germany*.

APPENDIX A. THE STRUCTURE OF THE "INDUSTRIAL GROUPS" IN THE FIELD OF HOUSING AND BUILDING CONSTRUCTION

The top agency, Reich Group Industry (*Reichsgruppe Industrie*), is subdivided according to the various Industrial Groups (*Wirtschaftsgruppen*).

The following are of importance for housing and building construction:

Industrial Group, Building Industry (*Wirtschaftsgruppe Bauindustrie*);

Industrial Group, Wood Processing Industry (*Wirtschaftsgruppe Holzverarbeitende Industrie*);

Industrial Group, Sawing Industry (*Wirtschaftsgruppe Sägeindustrie*).

The *Wirtschaftsgruppe Bauindustrie* has headquarters in Berlin W 35, Lützow-Ufer 1a. In 1939 its chief was Eugen Vögler,¹ of an Essen construction concern, and its affairs were managed by Karl Knecht. The *Wirtschaftsgruppe Bauindustrie* is subdivided by regions and by specializations. There are 16 Regional Groups (*Bezirksgruppen*), 5 Specialized Subgroups (*Fachabteilungen*) and 1 Collective Specialized Subgroup (*Sammelfachabteilung*). The Specialized Subgroup for Building Construction Above Ground (*Fachabteilung Hochbau*) is again departmentalized by specializations (*Fachunterabteilung*). It comprises, for example, a department for dwelling construction (*Fachunterabteilung Wohnungsgeschosbau*). The chief of both the Subgroup for Building Construction Above Ground and the Department for Dwelling Construction is Max Knüttel of the Berlin construction concern Boswau & Knauer.

The *Wirtschaftsgruppe Holzverarbeitende Industrie* has a Subgroup (*Fachgruppe*) Building Accessories Industry (*Bauzubehörindustrie*) with Departments (*Fachabteilungen*) for Inlaid Floors (*Parkett*); Doors and Windows (*Türen und Fenster*); Blinds (*Rollläden*); Wood Pavement and Wood Pipes (*Holzpflaster und Holzrehre*); Pipe and Wood Fabric (*Rohr- und Holzstabgewebe*). It also has a Subgroup (*Fachuntergruppe*) for Wooden Building Construction (*Holzbauindustrie*); its chief Mekelnburg, and its Manager, Baum, maintain offices at Berlin SW 11, Saarlandstr, 101-103., This Subgroup has the following Departments (*Fachabteilungen*); Wooden Building, Halls and Barracks Construction (*Holzhaus-, Hallen- und Barackenbau*); Greenhouses (*Gewächshaus- und Frühbeetfenster*).

The *Wirtschaftsgruppe Sägeindustries* has a Subgroup Wood for Impregnation Works (*Fachgruppe Holzimprägnierwerke*) and another for Plane Works (*Hobelwerke*).

¹ Vögler was appointed "Vertrauensmann für die gesamte Organisation der gewerblichen Wirtschaft, soweit sie die Bauwirtschaft berührt."

APPENDIX B. THE DEUTSCHE BAU- UND BODENBANK, NON-PROFIT HOUSING CORPORATIONS, AND BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS

1. Among the instrumentalities of the Reich, the Deutsche Bau- und Bodenbank is most prominent in the field of housing and building construction. This Bank, which was organized some decades ago, acts as a sort of fiscal agent in these matters and its position can be compared with the corporations affiliated with the RFC in the United States. Its stock is held, to a large extent, by the Reich, while the remainder was, some years ago, in the portfolios of the States, municipal associations and semipublic bodies engaged in housing construction.

2. A prominent role in the field of building is performed by non-profit housing corporations (*gemeinnützige Wohnungsunternehmen*), of which there are approximately 3,800 in Germany. They embrace among others, the *Baugenossenschaften* (building cooperatives). They own some 1,344,000 dwellings, or roughly 7 percent of the total. Their importance is characterized by the fact that they built 589,000, or approximately one-third, of all dwellings completed between 1933 and 1940.

The activities of these corporations are regulated by the Law of 29 February 1940 (*Wohnungsgemeinnützigkeitsgesetz*). They are united in an Association, the *Reichsverband des deutschen gemeinnützigen Wohnungswesens*. The Law and the model charter issued by the association cite as the principal function of the corporation the administration of dwellings. Specifically they build or acquire dwellings, lease and maintain them, and may also accept deposits and savings of their members. In this way the corporations have accumulated considerable funds which are available for financing new building.

3. Building and Loan Associations (*Bausparkassen*) have acquired only local importance in Germany. In recent years they have in the main been engaged in accumulating funds for the use of their members in the future when building activity in general would no longer be hampered by wartime restrictions. Members have not been able to utilize the amounts due to them for building but have been forced by conditions to leave their accounts with the Building and Loan Associations. The Associations provide first as well as second mortgages and it is especially as lenders of second mortgages that they fulfill a much needed function.

There are altogether about 5,000 Building and Loan Associations. The number of new contracts with depositors rose from 17,000 in 1939 to 54,000 in 1941; the increase presumably reflects the increase in incomes and the declining volume of opportunities for immediate consumption. In more recent years the business has continued to increase.

APPENDIX C. TENANT PROTECTION LAW AND RENT CONTROL LAW

The Tenant Protection Law (*Mieterschutzgesetz*) is based upon the principle that, in view of the limited opportunities for tenants to select dwellings, the termination of existing leases and the eviction

of tenants are to be restricted to a specified number of cases and to be achieved by means of a suitable legal procedure before the courts and special offices of the municipalities. Thus the effects of a notice on the part of the landlord are severely limited.

The Rent Control Law (*Reichmietengesetz*) fixes the rentals in buildings completed before 1 July 1918 as a percentage of the rentals charged on 1 July 1914 (pre-war rent). The present rate has been 110 percent since 1 January 1932. Originally all residential and business premises were subject to the Law, but business premises and the larger residential dwelling were exempted at times. The Price Stop Decree, which prohibits price increases as of 18 October 1936, does not apply to rentals which are subject to the provisions of the Rent Control Law. It applies, however, to other rentals, i. e., rentals for buildings completed after 1 July 1918 and rentals exempted from the Rent Control Law.

With respect to rentals subject to the Price Stop Decree, increases are permitted only under the hardship clause with the consent of the price authority. The municipal governments have been appointed price authorities in all matters pertaining to rentals.

APPENDIX D. PRICE CONTROL

The prices of building material have risen more sharply in recent years than other prices. Although most of the increase occurred during the thirties, the special character of wartime building, which to a considerable extent consisted of construction work of a nature quite different from that of peacetime building construction, has increased the cost of building. In a decree of 8 March 1943, the Reich Price Commissioner referred to the following factors as contributing to the increase in the prices of building materials:

1. With respect to the contractors:

a. The rapidity with which construction work must be accomplished;

b. Low productivity of labor, especially of foreign labor;

c. Elimination of competition;

d. Exploitation of the favorable market situation.

2. With respect to the proprietor of the building to be erected:

a. Insufficient planning and preparation;

b. Incomplete description of the required building;

c. Defective formulation of the building contract;

d. Defective price control.

The increase in building cost is reflected by the fact that, in the suburban small settlements, net construction costs have increased from RM 16.48 in 1935 to RM 24.18 in 1941 per cubic meter of dwelling space. These figures do not include expenses for the acquisition of land, clearing, road building, and the personnel overhead for planning and supervision, but they reflect the changes in the prices of building material, in wages, and in types and methods of building construction. The increase was most rapid during the late thirties when an annual increase in cost of from 11 to 13 percent occurred. The smaller increase (by .6 percent) in 1940 and the decrease by 1.8 percent in 1941 presumably reflect a simplification in construction and material.

Regional and local variations in building cost are determined largely

by the size of the community in question. The costs were in excess of the average for the Reich in East, Central, and Northwest Germany; they fell short of the average in West and South Germany.

The cost of building is subject to the following regulations:

1. The Regulation of Building Prices (*Baupreisordnung*), which was passed shortly before the war;
2. The Rules for the Determination of Prices upon the Basis of the Cost of Building for Public Agencies (*Leitsätze für die Preisermittlung auf Grund der Selbstkosten bei Bauleistungen öffentlicher Auftraggeber*), or "LSBO."
3. Paragraph 22 of the War Economics Decree (*Kriegswirtschaftsverordnung*), which imposes a general duty to lower prices.

It was held by the authorities that the formulation of standardized prices was not feasible in the field of building owing to the existing differentiation.

The new organization of the building industry in 1943 and the organization of the building industry in the "Hauptausschuss Bau" was bound to aggravate further the price situation by facilitating monopolistic arrangements on the part of the constructors. It was thus held desirable to make price control more effective by a more intensive participation of the price agencies in the formulation of the contracts, by greater reliance on expert auditors and cost accountants, and by the elaboration of a suitable master contract. The Regulations for Contracts for Public Buildings (*Verdingungsordnung für Bauleistungen*, VOB) established as a rule a fixed-price contract. This, however, has been superseded during the war by a variety of cost-plus contracts.

APPENDIX E. EMERGENCY LEGISLATION PERTAINING TO THE UTILIZATION OF EXISTING DWELLINGS

1. The Decree for the Regulation of Housing Space of 27 February 1943

The Decree for the Regulation of Housing Space authorizes the District Housing Commissioners (*Gauwohnungskommissare*) and the municipalities and associations of municipalities (*Gemeinden* and *Gemeindeverbände*) to make local or regional ordinances designed to—

- a. locate unoccupied dwelling space.
- b. rebuild and alterate existing dwellings with a view to making available new dwelling space,
- c. reconvert dwelling space which has been converted to other uses,
- d. create priorities for the use of dwelling space by preferred groups for the population.

By exercising their jurisdiction in a concrete case, the authorities create a lease contract, the lessee being protected by the provisions of the Tenant Protection Law.

"The "privileged" and "favored" groups include the following:

Privileged:

- a. War disabled of Grade IV.
- b. Holders of the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross.
- c. Families of victims of the present war who have lost more than two members of the family by war action.
- d. Deserving families with at least five children not yet of age and residing permanently in the household.

e. Deserving families who have lost their homes by enemy action, or whose present homes constitute threats to life, health, or morale.

Favored:

a. Families of war disabled of Grades II and III with at least one child not yet of age in the household.

b. Holders of the Knight's Cross.

c. Families of victims of the present war with at least two children not yet of age in the household, when either the husband or at least one son has been killed by enemy action.

d. Deserving families with at least four children not yet of age permanently living in the household.

The priority of the "privileged" groups ranks higher than that of the "favored." As can readily be seen, these groups extend over so large a number of persons that nonpriority people have little chance of obtaining a dwelling. On the other hand, the favored and privileged groups are so large relatively to the available facilities that the local authorities have too much discretion in the actual distribution of dwellings.

"Worthy" bombed-out families once were placed on an equal footing with the preferred groups of the population. This general rule was, however, modified and limited to inhabitants of officially determined evacuation or reception areas in order to restrict the movements of bombed-out people.

In the Executive Order of 27 September 1943 reference is made to the application of the Decree to dwellings erected for specific groups of employees with the help of the concern which employs them (*Werkwohnungen, werk geförderte Wohnungen*). The Decree had provided that such dwellings should be exempted from its provisions, provided that within a given region at least 10 percent of the dwellings of one concern are inhabited by tenants belonging to the preferred groups of the population. If the proportion of dwellings thus inhabited is less than 10 percent, the municipality must allocate the dwellings which are made available under the terms of the Decree to persons of the preferred groups who are, or will become, employees of the concern. In cases where the concern owns less than 10 but more than 2 dwellings in a given region, at least 1 dwelling must be used by persons belonging to the preferred groups.

With respect to the reconversion of dwelling space which has been converted to other uses, the Decree provides² that ordinances may be issued by which business enterprises may be requested by the municipality to clear the facilities occupied by them. If they need other facilities, this request may only be made if they are notified of alternative space. Landlords are required to put the building in such condition that it can again be used as a dwelling or to permit such steps on the part of the municipality.

According to the Decree of 8 March 1943 a time limit is no longer placed on the conversion of dwellings. It is at present possible to request reconversion of dwellings even though they have been converted to other uses before 20 April 1936.

The Decree makes it lawful for a municipality to requisition facilities utilized by business enterprises even though they are not composed

² The Decree goes beyond earlier provisions, for example, those of the Decree on the Prohibition of Conversion of 14 August 1942 (*Verordnung über das Verbot der Zweckentfremdung*). This decree had made it unlawful to convert dwelling space to other uses.

of converted dwellings, provided that they are not utilized to the fullest possible extent. Landlords are required to make space of this type available to concerns which had to give up their facilities for reconversion.

A special situation existed with respect to the reconversion of space which was originally not intended to serve as a dwelling but was later on converted to a dwelling. Since the Decree of 14 August 1942 makes it unlawful to convert dwellings to other uses, it was apparently not permitted to reconvert space which was originally not intended to serve as a dwelling but later on was converted to a dwelling. In consequence, people were hesitant to convert other facilities to dwellings because they feared that they would not be permitted to reconvert such facilities. Such conversion, however, was held highly desirable and it can be expected to continue to be desirable under military occupation. On 19 March 1943 the Reich Housing Commissioner stated his general willingness to permit the reconversion of facilities of the described character to business purposes at the proper time, i. e., at a time when the need for business facilities would be more pressing while the need for dwelling space would have abated.

At present the time when reconversion work is undertaken and the extent to which it is carried out depend on the volume of repair and alteration work involved and on the regulation of the authorities in charge of the various raw materials and of labor.

The applicability of the Decree for the Regulation of Housing Space is limited in that it:

- a. facilitates only the utilization of unoccupied dwelling space;
- b. provides only for the allocation of a regular dwelling;
- c. provides for allocation to family units;
- d. provides for priorities with groups and individuals competing for available facilities.

The decree must therefore be supplemented by the Decree for the Supply of Housing Space for the Bombed-Out Population and Reich Law on Exactions.

2. The Decree for the Supply of Housing Space for the Bombed-Out Population of 21 June 1943

This Decree is designed to make the following types of dwelling space available to bombed-out persons:

- a. Subsidiary dwellings (*Nebenwohnungen*);
- b. Enlarged dwellings (*Ausbauwohnungen*);
- c. Converted dwellings (*zweckentfremdete Wohnungen*). As in the case of the Decree for the Regulation of Housing Space, measures taken under this Decree create lease contracts, but the lessee is not protected by the Tenant Protection Law. Unless a building program gets under way in a relatively short time, it may be desirable to extend the protection of this law to lessees who have obtained dwellings under the Decree.

In general, the Decree provides that at least as many persons may be assigned to a dwelling as there are rooms in it. Rooms as defined in the Decree cover at least 10 quadrat meters. Kitchen, bath, and such space as is used in the exercise of an occupation are not counted

as rooms. According to an official interpretation by the Reich Housing Commissioner of 28 July 1943, the number of persons accommodated may, in case of need in excess of the standard, be set by the Decree.

If a tenant is given notice, the municipality is under duty to provide other facilities for him.

3. The Reich Law on Exactions

The Reich Law on Exactions (*Reichsleistungsgesetz*) of 1 September 1939 authorizes the local authorities, acting as agents of the Reich, to requisition facilities under the following conditions:

For billeting purposes, rooms and space are to be made available insofar as the provider of the billet is not thereby prevented from using rooms and space indispensable for his own dwelling, industrial, professional, or trade needs. This accommodation may consist of billets for persons, stables, and covered places for animals and transport, arms, and tools, and such workrooms, offices, space, and storage room as are necessary.

The Reich Law on Exactions is designed to provide temporary dwelling space for any group of persons. It has been used for the provisional accommodation of bombed-out persons, and in cases where the space made available under the provisions of the Decree for the Supply of Housing Space for the Bombed-out Population did not suffice.

The application of this Decree and the Reich Law on Exactions has been interpreted in a decree of the Reich Minister of the Interior and the Reich Housing Commissioner of 28 July 1943. According to this Decree, the following differences between the Decree and the Law must be considered:

a. The Law facilitates the accommodation of any group of people provided that their accommodation is helpful in accomplishing an objective of the Reich. The Decree facilitates the accommodation of bombed-out persons only.

b. Under the Law, the prospective landlord is not entitled to select specific individuals for making available to them dwelling space in accordance with the provisions of the Law. Under the Decree, he is given time for selecting specific bombed-out persons; only, if he does not make such selection, he must accept such persons as are billeted with him by the authorities.

c. Under the Law, household furnishings in the possession of the prospective landlord must be made available; under the Decree, the landlord may or may not make such furnishing available.

d. Under the Law, the relationship between the municipality and the owner of the facilities is one of public law. The latter has no access to the ordinary law courts in such matters as rent payment and eviction. For eviction, application must be made to the municipal billeting office, and payments for the use of the facilities are determined under a special procedure provided by the Law. Under the decree, a lease contract is created between the owner of the facilities and the person assigned to him. The latter does not enjoy the protection of the Tenant Protection Law and can thus be given notice. Disputes between the landlord and tenant are decided by the ordinary law courts.

APPENDIX F. FINANCIAL MEASURES DESIGNED TO FACILITATE MORE INTENSIVE UTILIZATION OF EXISTING DWELLINGS

The Decree on Grants-in-Aid of 8 March 1943 states that Reich grants are given for the following purposes:

a. Subdivision of dwellings and alterations of buildings with a view to gaining additional dwellings, provided that the subdivision produces at least two, and the alteration one, independent dwellings. The term alteration includes the construction of an additional top story as well as construction work in the attic; it also includes the conversion of industrial or other facilities to dwellings.

b. Improvement of housing conditions of families with at least three children. In this case the improvement need not produce an "independent dwelling," and the contribution is granted without regard to the nature of the dwelling (home, rented quarters, etc.).

Grants for these purposes are given with the proviso that the dwellings or parts of dwellings may exclusively be used as dwellings during a period of 5 years and that the rental, if they are rented, must be "adequate" as determined by the housing authorities.

The grant is normally 50 percent of the total cost. In special cases it may be raised to 75 percent provided that no other economical method of financing is feasible. It may be raised to 100 percent if the proprietor cannot reasonably be expected to contribute to the cost, as, for example, if the total rentals of the subdivided facilities fall short of the previous rental, or if they would not suffice for adequate interest on and amortization of the proprietor's expenses for the subdivision.

In place of that part of the grant which would exceed 50 percent of the cost, the Reich may give a loan, provided that the subdivision, alteration, or other change of the facilities produces new dwellings and thereby results in an additional yield from the building. The minimum loan is RM 200. Interest on the loan is 3 percent (which may be reduced in cases of hardship and the like) and 1 percent is added for amortization. Loans are granted if the additional yield under sound management suffices for servicing them.

c. Grants may also be given for repair and supplementary works connected with the reconversion of dwellings which have been used for other purposes, as well as for other measures of housing policy. Repair works are defined as activities designed to remove defects of the building. Supplementary works include additions or installations which increase the value of the facilities over a time, such as electrical, gas heating, air conditioning, bath, and toilet installations.

In these cases the grant is normally 50 percent of the cost and may be increased to 100 percent if this is necessary and the proprietor cannot reasonably be expected to contribute to the cost.

In cases of repair and other works which do not facilitate the reconversion of a dwelling but are intended to make the dwelling inhabitable, grants amounting to 50 percent of the cost may be given. The percentage may be increased to 75 percent if this is necessary in order to avoid economic difficulties for the applicant. As has been seen, grants of this type have often been supplemented by contributions of the Nazi People's Welfare Organization (NSV).

According to the Circular of 12 August 1943 these grants may also be given with a view to facilitating the reconversion of stores, offices, and other space, if it is intended to make these facilities available to business concerns which have been removed from converted facilities.

d. Emigration from places where housing facilities are in extremely short supply, and evacuation of large dwellings.

In these cases contributions are given to the cost of moving unless it takes place for reasons exclusively connected with the interests of the mover. The grant is 50 percent but may be increased to 100 percent if this is necessary and the applicant cannot reasonably be expected to contribute to the cost of moving.

If the mover cannot find a dwelling which would be available at the same rental which he paid before, or if he cannot be expected to be satisfied with such a dwelling, and must consequently pay a higher rental, the Reich may pay the difference between the previous and present rentals for 3 years.

e. Compensation of losses on the part of the landlords for damages suffered through measures taken in application of the Decree for the Regulation of Housing Space of 27 February 1943 or the Decree on the Conversion of Dwellings of 14 August 1942.

If landlords had to stand a loss of rentals in consequence of these measures, they may receive a grant amounting to five times the annual difference between previous and present rentals.

According to the Circular of 12 August 1943 tenants who have sublet the whole or part of their dwelling may receive corresponding grants to the extent to which their rent has suffered a curtailment in consequence of measures described in section 5 above.

Grants of the types described in the preceding pages are not to be given for the repair or restoration of buildings which have been destroyed or damaged in the course of warfare. Such grants are given in accordance with the provisions of the War Damage Decree (*Kriegsschädenverordnung*) of 30 November 1940.

The financing of emergency shelter facilities for bombed-out persons is more fully dealt with in a circular of the Reich Minister of the Interior of 5 February 1943.


Loans for barracks construction are provided in a Decree of the Reich Minister of Labor of 15 September 1942. This Decree is designed to make available facilities to business concerns in place of those which have been cleared for purposes of reconversion to dwellings. The Decree states that, if barracks would supply suitable facilities for the business, the municipalities may finance such barrack construction by means of loans to be granted by the Reich. The loans, which will be given only if the municipalities themselves make an adequate contribution to the costs of barrack construction, must in general be amortized at the rate of 5 percent per year, and the interest in general is 3 percent. However, if the rentals from the barracks are not expected to produce the amounts required for servicing the loans to the described extent, interest may be forgiven and amortization reduced to 1 percent.

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